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CORPORATE LAW AND THE MYTH OF
EFFICIENT MARKET CONTROL
William W. Bratton† & Simone M. Sepe‡

In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in
power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the
long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to
comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting.
The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic
model that focuses on one problem only: management agency
costs. With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider
lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and
information asymmetries. General equilibrium (GE) theory
provides that lens. Several lessons follow from reference to
this higher-order economic theory. First, the presumption that
markets can efficiently coordinate the economy is unfounded,
unless one relies on heroic assumptions. Second, GE shows
that shareholders suffer from misaligned incentives, undercutting any normative program grounded in shareholder empowerment. The third lesson is negative, as there are no
economically founded instructions for addressing the tradeoffs between agency costs reduction and market inefficiency
implied by the new shareholder corporation. Policy implications also follow. Given the lack of a clear normative template,
only private ordering can be counted on to address each corporation’s specific tradeoffs between agency costs and market
inefficiency. This conclusion leads to an endorsement of Delaware’s equitable adjudication system, the flexibility of which
is well suited to policing the bargaining process between managers and empowered shareholders.

† Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law &
Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute.
‡ Professor of Law and Finance, James E. Rogers College of Law, University
of Arizona; Université Toulouse 1 Capitole; and Toulouse School of Economics.
For comments and suggestions on prior drafts, our thanks to Andrea Attar, John
Finnis, Ron Gilson, Michael Knoll, Seth Kreimer, Colin Mayer, Saura Masconale,
and participants at workshops at the Penn and Tennessee law schools, the PennToulouse Conference on Corporate Law and Economic Theory, the Yale Law
School, Center for Private Law’s Conference on Private Funds, and the 2018
Penn/NYU Conference on Law and Finance.
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INTRODUCTION
A central question in corporate legal theory is whether
large corporations should be conceived as hierarchical enclaves that operate apart from markets or as entities that operate within markets and under market control. The majority
favors market control, making two basic assumptions: first,
shareholders have the right incentives to mitigate the managerial agency problem, and, second, competitive markets are intrinsically superior to institutions as coordinators of
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production.1 In practice, recent developments appear to vindicate this majority view, turning shareholder empowerment
from a normative aspiration to a positive reality.2 The rise of
hedge funds and other activist investors has brought an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders,
who are now empowered to determine business decisions at
publicly traded companies.
We take the occasion of these transformative changes to
put corporate legal theory’s majority view to the test, through a
comprehensive economic examination of the claim of efficient
market control. This examination brings to the forefront a substantial theory of markets and prices that has never been explored before in corporate law, general equilibrium theory (GE).
Reference to GE yields three major results. First, it exposes the
majority view as wanting, vindicating the work of scholars such
as Lynn Stout, who had long warned us against the risks of
ever-increasing shareholder power.3 As this Article will show,
economic theory does not support a normative template in
favor of market control of the corporation but instead poses a
fundamental tradeoff between agency cost reduction and market inefficiency. Second, once we take this economic finding
back to legal theory, private bargaining emerges as better
suited to resolve this tradeoff than would be corporate law reform. Third, this finding also has implications for corporate
law, supporting Delaware’s equitable adjudication system and
its flexible case-by-case approach as especially well suited to
the mediation of the bargaining process between managers and
empowered shareholders.
We begin our analysis by tracing corporate legal theory’s
equation of market control and economic efficiency back to its
1

See infra subparts I.B–C.
See infra section I.C.2.
3
Lynn Stout was among the most prominent voices to challenge the shareholder-centric view of the corporation, defending an alternative “team-production
model” that accounted for the role of other stakeholders in the corporate organization and warned against the inefficiencies of unconstrained shareholder power.
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC (2012) (highlighting both
possible and empirical impacts of shareholder primacy on various stakeholders);
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255 (2008) (analyzing the role that fiduciary duty law could play in
constraining the worst tendencies of shareholder primacy); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999) (introducing the team-production model); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-SoBad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002) (discussing the shortcomings of arguments favoring shareholder primacy).
2
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roots in Jensen and Meckling’s (J-M) principal-agent model4
and considering de novo the model’s implications for corporate
law.5 Key to understanding these implications is a neglected
feature of the J-M model: its narrow partial equilibrium framework. Partial equilibrium models deal with one market at a
time, taking the market in isolation in determining the equilibrium outcome. More prosaically, these models proceed on the
key assumption that all “other things [are] equal.”6 The J-M
analysis thus assumes that management moral hazard is the
firm’s only unsolved problem and then applies market control
to minimize the resulting agency costs. In the model’s framework of reference, agency cost reduction, and hence greater
shareholder influence, always enhances efficiency because all
other things are assumed to be not only equal but efficient.
Results produced in partial equilibrium analyses, however,
tend to vary with the “details” of the model—i.e., with the
model’s assumed variables of interest and the mode of exploring the variables’ behavior in an environment in which all other
variables are kept fixed. Under the assumption that management moral hazard is the firm’s sole problem, models in the JM line depict market shareholders as having better-aligned incentives than managers and then automatically attach efficient
consequences to shareholder governance. But there is another
line of partial equilibrium analysis—models of management
“myopia”7—which sends a contrary signal. Here the locus of
imperfection shifts from management moral hazard to the
asymmetric information problem bound up in the fact that
market shareholders know less about the business than do its
managers. On this different assumption, these models show
4
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976) (introducing the concept of agency costs and positing a nexus of contracts
theory of the firm); see also section I.B.1 (discussing the J-M model).
5
The original arbitrage came from Easterbrook and Fischel, who expanded
the model. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (restating J-M in a legal framework); see also
section I.B.2 (discussing contractarianism).
6
See ROSS M. STARR, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2d ed.
2011).
7
See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of
Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) [hereinafter Stein,
Efficient Capital Markets] (modeling suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C.
Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–67
(1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats] (showing formally that, even absent
agency costs, managers of the firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced asset).
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formally that inefficiencies result under greater shareholder
influence.
How then can we decide which model is “right” when confronted with opposite results, as in the case of the J-M and
myopia models? The answer is that we cannot. Both sets of
models should be seen as useful examples which can highlight
logical shortcomings in normative arguments. But neither can
provide the basis for a more general theory with normative
implications for corporate governance. This is the infirmity at
the core of corporate legal theory: it takes J-M’s brilliant example8 and deploys it as a normative theory.
This Article’s introduction of general equilibrium theory to
corporate governance seeks to remedy this infirmity. Unlike in
partial equilibrium analysis, in a general equilibrium framework the equilibrium concept sweeps in all markets simultaneously and incorporates their interactions.9 Methodologically,
GE looks at the economy as a closed and interrelated system,
simultaneously determining the equilibrium values of all variables of interest in all markets. Further, because all relevant
variables are considered as endogenous, a change in one variable always results in re-computation of all other variables.10
This explains why GE can aspire to normative implications
where a partial equilibrium model cannot.
At this point, we anticipate an irrelevance objection. This
posits that there is such a thing as a theory that is too high—
too mathematical and too complicated (GE is both)—to provide
a robust basis for real world policymaking. That is why law and
economics, whose job it is to apply microeconomic theory in an
imperfect world where things need to get done, avoids confronting GE and instead draws on simpler partial equilibrium
models for inspiration. The answer to this objection is that,
given the rise of empowered shareholders it is no longer prudent or sensible to ignore GE’s microeconomics of markets.
Shareholder empowerment substantially increases the magnitude of market control of business decision-making, holding
out cognizable possibilities of perverse results. Mainstream
corporate legal theory lacks the tools to conceptualize these
possibilities. Things were different during the era of separated
8
Corporate legal theory largely ignored myopia models until the financial
crisis of 2007–2008. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Eclipse of
the Shareholder Paradigm 56 (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
9
STARR, supra note 6, at 5.
10
ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 511 (1995).

R
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ownership and control, when unchecked management power
was indeed the salient governance problem. In that context,
the economics of agency adequately addressed the policy task
at hand. Today we have a different, more complex practice
picture with which to grapple. To do so adequately we need to
reframe corporate legal theory by reference to GE’s more substantial theory of prices and markets.
Reference to GE yields three crucial lessons. The first concerns the widely held assumption that economic theory instructs us that consumer surplus is maximized when
competitive markets guide production. GE shows that this assumption is unfounded unless one also assumes complete markets, as did Arrow and Debreu in the first and fundamental GE
model of the economy.11 Complete markets imply a world
where everything can be traded and parties can deal with uncertainty by insuring their preferences in advance, almost as if
uncertainty did not exist.12 A reasonable observer quickly will
conclude, however, that markets are, in fact, not complete.
Once this reality is factored in, GE shows that market control
yields inefficient results.
The second lesson follows when one brings GE models of
business decision-making by shareholders to corporate legal
theory. The models yield a picture of distorted incentives due
to market incompleteness, with the shareholders making production decisions based on idiosyncratic consumption preferences rather than fundamental value.13 GE models also show
uncertainty undermining market pricing accuracy, results that
are replicated by contemporary asset pricing theory.14 The two
results completely undercut corporate law’s prevailing market
control paradigm. Microeconomics teaches that it is not safe to
assume that agency cost reduction stemming from the shareholder power shift maximizes value. It instead situates us in a
world with a two-sided incentive problem, one concerning managers and already well-traversed in corporate legal theory and

11
´
See GERARD
DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
EQUILIBRIUM 98–102 (1959); Kenneth J. Arrow & Gérard Debreu, Existence of an
Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954). The operative Walrasian mathematics were worked out in Gérard Debreu, A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, 38 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 886 (1952). See also infra
subpart II.B (discussing the A-D model in detail).
12
YVAN LENGWILER, MICROFOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICING 20 (2004).
13
See infra section III.B.1.
14
See infra subpart III.C.
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the other concerning shareholders and only beginning to be
acknowledged, much less studied.
The third lesson is negative, for GE does not tell us how
optimally to address the two-sided problem of agency costs and
market inefficiency. The shift of decision-making power to
shareholders transforms the corporation into a hybrid form
that straddles the firm and the markets. As yet no general
economic theory tells us the best way to structure this hybrid
corporate form. Indeed, economic theory does not even offer
any useful presumptions. While the microeconomics of incentives shows (in partial equilibrium examples) that agency cost
reduction enhances firm value, GE denudes the assertion of
normative salience when it shows that shareholder business
decision-making can produce suboptimal results. At the same
time, while GE models could appear to support a policy presumption against shareholder empowerment, a closer look
teaches a different lesson. Management moral hazard remains
in the GE’s picture as a source of market incompleteness, thus
blocking any antishareholder or promanagement
presumptions.
We walk away from these lessons with two policy recommendations and a novel economic justification of Delaware’s
system of judicial decision-making. The first recommendation
suggests a moratorium on policy proposals favoring either market control or management insulation. While GE’s ultimate
normative teaching is negative, it is by no means irrelevant for
it implies a presumption that proposals for either market control or for management insulation lack support in economic
theory and have distortionary effects in practice. This lesson
by itself has radical implications for corporate legal theory.
A second recommendation follows from this cautionary
policy outcome, one that restates and updates the old presumption favoring private ordering in corporate governance.
Economic theory counsels that in an imperfect world off-market contracting that directs incentives in the proper direction
offers a more promising route to productive efficiency than
does market control. More promising but not necessarily efficient: in bargaining theory, the party with bargaining power
controls the result whether or not the outcome is optimal. It
follows that the possibility of contracting does not preclude
suboptimal outcomes, as it cannot rule out the opportunistic
abuse of bargaining power by either managers or empowered
shareholders. Today’s challenge for corporate law is thus to
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avoid distortionary dominance of the bargaining process by
either contracting party.
We also make a prediction: corporate law, as interpreted
and enforced in Delaware, is well-positioned to face the challenges posed by the hybrid corporation. Delaware courts have
never imposed maximizing directives based on economic theory. They instead leave the basic alignment of the parties’ entitlements to the parties’ own bargaining process and address
problems that arise in the course of events through a pragmatic
process of equitable adjudication. As equity adjudicators, the
Delaware chancellors have wide latitude to mold earlier decisions to fit new facts and thereby adapt the law to ever-changing economic circumstances and legal relationships.15 In light
of the results of our analysis, we think this flexible approach
can be characterized as economically astute. Of course, equity’s flexibility leaves room for residual indeterminacy. But, in
the case of Delaware law, this indeterminacy should be welcomed as the consequentialist legal response to GE’s indeterminate results. GE fails to tell us how to trade off managerial
opportunism (agency costs) against shareholder opportunism
(market inefficiency) because the relative costs and benefits
cannot be determined ex ante. But if there is no template for
future forms of opportunism, then judging cannot follow from
rigid rules. Ex-post discretion to address case-specific facts is
required instead. Delaware’s equity system ensures that its
adjudicators possess the requisite skills.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes
the evolution of corporate legal theory and its changing answers to the question of the relative merits of hierarchies and
markets. It starts with the hierarchical view of the corporation
of the mid-twentieth century, then moves to the 1980s import
of the J-M agency model through the contractarian theory of
Easterbrook and Fischel, and closes with the rise of the now
dominant market control paradigm. Part II introduces GE to
corporate governance for the first time, starting at square one
with the first and second theorems of welfare economics and
the distinction between partial and general equilibrium analysis. It then goes on to describe the evolution of GE, from the
Arrow-Debreu model and its assumption-laden picture of market success to the conclusion that markets fail to coordinate
the economy efficiently due to market incompleteness. Part III
discusses GE’s implications for the positive model of the firm
15
William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to the Delaware Court of Chancery
1792–1992, 48 BUS. LAW. 363, 365 (1992).
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and the rise of shareholder empowerment, showing how GE
helps to explain particulars of the legal corporate form and
describing GE’s prediction that shareholder participation in
business planning will lead to suboptimal results. Lastly, Part
IV explores the legal ramifications of our analysis, looking first
at the normative message of GE for current corporate governance, then formulating policy recommendations for corporate
legal theory, and finally considering corporate law as interpreted and enforced in Delaware.
I
MANAGEMENT POWER AND MARKET CONTROL
The theories that inform corporate law have evolved over
time in response to events. We accordingly present our case for
paradigmatic revision of the market control paradigm as a lesson of history, reviewing the successive responses that corporate legal theory has provided to the question of the relative
merits of hierarchies and markets in coordinating corporate
production.
We begin, in subpart I.A, with the mid-twentieth century
consensus description of large corporations as managementdominated hierarchies that operate outside of markets. Subpart I.B takes up the neoclassical reversal of this position that
began in the 1970s, when Jensen and Meckling’s principalagent model16 was unpacked and expanded in the contractarianism of Easterbrook and Fischel,17 resulting in the assertion
that markets and contracts could solve all problems addressed
in corporate law. Subpart I.C explains how the neoclassical
market success story was subsequently transformed into a law
reform story when the disappearance of the primary market
control mechanism, the hostile takeover, was attributed to regulatory interference. The economics of agency were then redirected into a regulatory program to reinstate market control
through shareholder empowerment. The advent of empowered
shareholders finally brings this about, albeit as the result of
changes in the pattern of shareholding and the rise of activist
hedge funds rather than from regulatory intervention.

16

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4.
See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5 (discussing Jensen and
Meckling’s principal-agent model in the context of contractarianism).
17

R
R
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A. Hierarchies Outside of Markets
When observers looked at big companies during the midtwentieth century, they saw empowered hierarchs. Most
agreed that management power ineluctably flowed from organizational expertise and that structural impediments foreclosed
the possibility of putting hierarchical firms under market control.18 Markets were seen as intrinsically incapable of providing an environment conducive to complex production.19
Moreover, based on the experience of the Great Depression,
most people thought of markets as generally prone to fail.
The leading description, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, first published in
1932, asserted that the modern corporate economy had superseded the classical, Smithian picture of a successfully selfcorrecting market economy.20 The Berle and Means diagnosis
implied an accountability problem and a regulatory response: if
the forces of supply and demand could not regulate the decision-makers at the top of corporate hierarchies, government
controls needed to be substituted both as regarded management moral hazard and the coordination of production and
pricing decisions with the interests of the wider economy. By
the end of World War II, many thought that New Deal reforms
had satisfactorily ameliorated the accountability problem and
achieved the requisite degree of coordination.21 Indeed, managers came to enjoy great prestige as successful economic
planners as the post-war economy expanded.
Hierarchical thinking also found its way into
microeconomics. Ronald Coase integrated the classical economic description and the hierarchical view of corporate pro18
See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989).
19
See, e.g., DENNIS HOLME ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1949)
(viewing corporations not as extensions of markets but as “islands of conscious
power in [the markets’] ocean of unconscious co-operation”).
20
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 1, 45–46 (Macmillan reissue 1933) (noting that economic power
had concentrated in the hands of corporate managers and that the corporate
system amounted to a major social institution); see also MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS 425 (paperback ed. 2002) (describing
Berle and Means as the founders of the economics of management moral hazard);
Gardiner C. Means, Hessen’s Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1983) (showcasing Means’s dissatisfaction with aspects of a colleague’s reappraisal of a previous joint work).
21
ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 82, 91, 99 (1963)
(describing interdependence between the state and the economy, with the state
taking ultimate responsibility and exercising the higher level of power but intervening only to stabilize performance).
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duction in a famous essay published in 1937.22 Coase drew a
line between market coordination and production in firms. He
posited that if markets held out a framework conducive to complex production, then actors could be expected to produce
based on individual transactions in markets and firms would
not exist. But firms did exist and production occurred therein.
For an explanation, Coase looked to transaction costs. Production through individual contracts would be too expensive.23
Hierarchical structure reduces this cost, facilitating complex
economic endeavor by turning coordination over to an
entrepreneur.24
B. The Neo-Classical Revolution
Corporate legal theory turned away from hierarchies to a
market-based description of large corporations in the century’s
closing decades. Things had changed. The 1970s stagflation
economy undermined confidence in both the managementdominated corporate production system25 and the regulatory
state.26 People were ready to return their trust to markets.
Law and economics scholars assured them that improvements
would follow—first through the introduction of the neoclassical
agency cost model of Jensen and Meckling27 and, next,
through Easterbrook and Fischel’s legal adaptation and expansion of that model.28
22

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Id. at 390–92 (arguing that organizing production through the price mechanism meant incurring the cost of ascertaining the prices and that long-term
relationships would be difficult to sustain).
24
Id. at 392.
25
See THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS &
THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993, at 3 (1997) (“Inflation became rampant and stagnation reappeared, not in the form of a cataclysmic Great Depression but by way of
minimal growth and sluggishness interrupted by bouts of severe recession and
only brief, ephemeral leaps into semblances of a boom.”).
26
GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 56 (2016); William W. Bratton, The Separation of
Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773–75 (2017).
27
The initial cross-reference occurred in Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1978).
28
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations
and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277–83 (1986) (noting that courts tend to
defer to contractual agreements rather than legal rules); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426–28
(1989) [hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Contract] (discussing what motivates a
corporation to choose a particular corporate agreement); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89,
94–96 (1985) (arguing that limited liability promotes managerial efficiency and
lowers agency costs); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages
23

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt

686

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-AUG-20

14:14

[Vol. 105:675

1. The Principal-Agent Model
J-M’s principal-agent model tells a corporate creation story
in which the only problem confronting the firm is management
moral hazard, which causes agency costs. In the model’s set
up, but for management moral hazard and shareholders’ and
managers’ arrangements in respect thereof, all other things are
not only equal but efficient.29 Agency costs are reduced to the
extent that managers find it cost effective to incur bonding
costs and investors find it cost effective to incur monitoring
costs.30 This does not mean that bonding, monitoring, and
contracting will reduce agency costs to zero. Instead, residual
agency costs that cannot be cost effectively eliminated will persist as an intrinsic production cost.31 This persistent residuum, however, is unproblematic because, in the model, the
equity trading market allocates residual agency costs to the
founder-manager at the moment of creation.32
The J-M model minimizes authority’s and hierarchy’s importance in describing corporate production, redirecting attention to contract. It deflects Coase’s description, making it
possible to show that private ordering in capital markets works
effectively in corporate governance, a private ordering comprised partly of market trading and partly of out-of-market negotiated contracting.33 But the model is also assumptionladen. The only operative factors are (1) a conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders arising from the manager’s rational incentive to self-serve, (2) the manager’s and
shareholder’s ability to contract with respect thereto, and (3)
the stock market’s ability to price out the conflict. Separation
in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 615–18 (1985) (discussing the implementation of economically efficient legal rules in the realm of securities law).
29
For exposition of the operation of and limitations on partial equilibrium
models, such as the J-M model, see infra subpart II.A.
30
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 323–26.
31
Id. at 327–28.
32
Id. at 313–14, 318–19.
33
More particularly, market trading prices management moral hazard and
allocates its cost; meanwhile, private contracting obviates any need for state
intervention in internal corporate affairs in cases where markets do not work.
Authority structures in firms do not disappear. J-M instead change the characterization of what it means to be a hierarchical inferior. For Coase, this implied a
sacrifice of liberty that required explanation. For J-M, the hierarchical inferior is
a contract counterparty who can always walk away. Id. at 310–11. J-M here
repeat a point made earlier by Alchian and Demsetz. See Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (firms have “no power of fiat, no authority, no
disciplinary action,” not differing “in the slightest degree, from ordinary market
contracting between any two people”).
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of ownership and control,34 shareholder votes,35 and hostile
takeovers36 are left over for future inquiry, along with every
other problem addressed in corporate governance, not to mention the matter of corporate interaction with exterior actors and
product markets. The J-M model, in effect, held out a blank
canvas on which legal theorists could paint in a thicker
description.
2. Contractarianism
Easterbrook and Fischel (E-F) filled in the canvas, turning
what is implicit in J-M into a sequence of normative assertions.37 They quietly relaxed J-M’s limiting assumptions so
that the model accommodated the real world’s corporate governance framework without needing significant modification.
At the bottom line came a radical assertion: between markets
and contracts, the main problems addressed in corporate law
were already being solved.
In E-F’s transformation of J-M, the “contract” is not just
the result of face-to-face bargaining at the moment the public
firm is created through an IPO, but corporate law itself and
internal corporate legislation (charters and bylaws) enacted
over time. This “contractarian” restatement also expands the
set of market controls of agency costs. In addition to stock
market pricing, the accuracy of which is deemed assured by
the efficient market hypothesis of financial economics (EMH),38
E-F rely on three additional sources of market control—hostile
takeovers (called the “market for corporate control”), the market for the firm’s products, and the executive labor market.
34
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 356 (“One of the most serious limitation [sic] of the analysis is that as it stands we have not worked out in this paper
its application to the very large modern corporation whose managers own little or
no equity.”).
35
Id. at 314 (assuming the stock sold at the moment of origin is nonvoting).
36
See id. (assuming that absent voting stock, a hostile takeover is
impossible).
37
Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 28, at 1426–31.
38
Markets would be “strong form” efficient if they priced in all information,
material nonpublic information as well as all public information. It is, however,
generally accepted that financial markets are not strong form efficient. See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (6th ed. 2002). In contrast, the EMH’s
“semi-strong” form is generally accepted. This, sometimes called “informational
efficiency,” posits that the capital markets embed all publicly available information into security prices. See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in 1
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 739, 739 (Peter Newman et al.
eds., 1992).
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The four markets operate together to assure agency cost minimization on a multiperiod basis, just as J-M predicted.39
Two broad claims about corporate law follow. First, there
should be a presumption against having any more corporate
law than already exists. Because rational actors arrange governance in contracts and markets price the contract terms,
legal mandates are justifiable only in the unlikely event that
“the terms chosen by firms are both unpriced and systematically perverse from investors’ standpoints.”40 Second, the inherited corporate law regime is economically rational,41
justifying a strong normative presumption in its favor.
E-F’s intervention triggered intense debate, a debate that
proceeded against the background of a practice shock—the
hostile takeover boom of the 1980s. The boom, widely seen as
a corrective of deficient management performance, was perfectly timed to import credibility to contractarianism. E-F, by
folding the market for corporate control into J-M’s moral hazard account, produced a neat explanation of what was going on
in the real world: moral hazard had caused agency costs to run
to excess and discounted stock prices reflected the value impairment. The discounts in turn attracted control bidders by
assuring an arbitrage profit, with the market-based control
transfer performing a critical agency cost reductive role.42
39
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4–5, 18–21, 91, 93, 96–97. The
market for corporate control originated with Henry Manne but had no connection
to hostile takeovers in Manne’s articulation. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 110, 112–13, 118, 119
(1965) (describing a market for corporate control and proposing that, absent
regulation, stock price declines would trigger disciplinary friendly mergers).
Manne changed his view later. See Henry G. Manne, A Free Market Model of a
Large Corporate System, 52 EMORY L.J. 1381, 1388–89 (2003). We also note that
reliance on a market triad (control, product, and employment) to control management does antedate Easterbrook and Fischel’s arbitrage of J-M. Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG.
STUD. 251, 262–70 (1977).
40
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 21. Easterbrook and Fischel
make a strong claim for institutional primacy for the market price without also
making a claim for strong form market price efficiency. Id. at 18–19.
41
Id. at 315.
42
Viewed retrospectively, J-M’s moral hazard account is unlikely to be satisfactory as a standalone explanation for 1980s takeovers—today’s empirical profile
holds out a much richer collection of causative factors. See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and
Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 10–18 (1995)
(looking at a range of factors to see whether any consistently predict that a firm
will become a hostile target and finding that only size proves a consistently successful predictor); Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry
Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 194–96
(1996) (showing that mergers come in waves and focus on specific industries).
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E-F’s arbitrage never gained ascendance in all particulars,
however. The sticking point was the capacious notion of contract,43 which encompasses all interaction between managers,
investors, consumers, and the government in a multiperiod,
dynamic setting that featured few actual negotiations44 even as
it promised efficient results. But even partial acceptance implied fundamental changes in the way people viewed corporate
law. Henceforth, policy discussions would proceed in a
microeconomic framework dominated by two normative presumptions—one presumption disfavoring new regulatory initiatives and one favoring market control.
C. The Market Control Paradigm
1. Market Control
Hostile takeovers changed the way people viewed corporations, but they disappeared in the wake of the 1989 economic
collapse. A public choice story circulated to explain the hostile
takeover’s disappearance. Managers seeking renewed insulation from the markets had gone to state legislatures and appealed to state judiciaries to promote antitakeover statutes and
otherwise validate takeover defensive measures.45 It followed
that in the post-takeover era agency costs were chronically and
suboptimally high.
A reformulation of the contractarian paradigm naturally
followed. The new formulation retained the principal-agent
43

See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 28, at 1428–34.
Legal notions of contract could not be stretched far enough to support the
E-F characterization. The more particular question was whether the territory of
“contract,” with its arm’s length bargains and equally situated parties, plausibly
covered the entire ground swept in by the contractarian firm, much of which was
apparently hierarchical in character. The consensus answer was that contractual
characterization was insufficiently robust to justify turning all of corporate law
into a default regime—fiduciary duties would have to remain mandatory because
proxy voting was not a process context suited to effective noncompetitive transacting. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
919 (1988) (criticizing the nexus of contracts theory of the firm); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) (same); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (same); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989) (same).
45
See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 458–65 (1988). Since the seminal 1985
decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc., Delaware courts have tilted
decidedly toward upholding the primacy of directorial power in deciding whether a
takeover bid should move forward. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (allowing company board of directors to adopt takeover
defense mechanisms).
44
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model’s exclusive focus on management moral hazard along
with an information-efficient account of stock market pricing.
But now, instead of a contracting field conducive to efficient
self-correction as predicted by E-F, we had a field riven with
collective action problems, path dependencies, and other failures.46 Regulation came back into the picture as a result, but
for the limited purpose of adjusting the process framework so
that market control of management conduct could work in fact.
Corporate governance needed positive law reforms directed to
shareholder empowerment so as finally to get us to the equilibrium posited at the start by J-M.47 Henceforth, the shareholders should have “ultimate control” of the firm.48 We call this
sequence of assertions the “market control” paradigm.
Market control meant removal of antitakeover barriers, but
that was not politically feasible. The policy agenda accordingly
looked toward “shareholder empowerment” more generally.
Management needed to be forced to yield to shareholder inputs
on governance and business planning on a going concern basis. Incentive alignment was the reason. Where managers’ incentives were compromised and suspect, shareholders had a
pure financial incentive to maximize value, and thus provided
the only unsullied planning inputs.49 That information asymmetries might impair the quality of any shareholder inputs was
not deemed to be a salient problem, for a market-based performance metric was available—the stock price.50
2. Shareholder Empowerment
Shareholder empowerment finally came about after the
turn of this century, not through law reform but through another practice shock—the massive reconcentration of corporate
46
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 644–45 (1996) (“The United States developed
corporate structures with strong managers and weak owners . . . partly due to
path dependence.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127,
129 (1999) (“Because of this path dependence, a country’s pattern of ownership
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had earlier.”).
47
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (recommending expansion of shareholder legislative access to the corporate charter and the state of incorporation
decision); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
Rev. 675, 699–702 (2007) (recommending a right to replace all incumbents every
two or three years).
48
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001).
49
Id. at 449.
50
Id. at 440–41.
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ownership and the rise of activist hedge funds. Some observers
resist the notion that this change is fundamental, arguing that
excess management agency costs continue to present a pressing policy problem.51 Others describe a difference in kind. Gilson and Gordon observe that the separation of ownership and
control has disappeared because shareholders now value (and
exercise) their franchise to shape business policy.52 Activist
investors are the transmission mechanism through which dispersed shareholder register their planning preferences.53 Thus
do market forces now determine planning outcomes even
though the infrastructure of corporate governance remains
unchanged.
Gilson and Gordon have the better view. With shareholder
empowerment, market prices set by anonymous trading shareholders determine the firm’s business plan on a going concern
basis, subordinating management. This is a fundamental
break with the hierarchical model of the corporation, a break
sharper and more fundamental even than that held out by
takeover-centric governance. The takeovers of the 1980s certainly did inject capital market inputs into production decisions. But corporate hierarchies were not displaced as a
Takeovers meant leveraged restructuring, which
result.54
tended to be followed by asset sales and cost-cutting. The
most effective defense was a voluntary, preemptive leveraged
restructuring, usually in the form of a private equity buyout.
Whether restructuring followed from a hostile takeover or defensive buyout, it was an all-or-nothing, one-time-only event
involving control transfer. If the transfer was hostile, an old
51
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Corporate ShortTermism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 978, 1006 (2013).
52
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 863, 865, 867, 874 (2013). Governance rights, formerly devalued, now are
employed for the purpose of value enhancement as the hedge funds use them in
tandem with firm-specific informational investment and monitoring. Id. at 891.
53
Id. at 867 (insisting that the hedge funds’ appearance “should be seen as
an endogenous response to the monitoring shortfall that follows from ownership
reconcentration in intermediary institutions”).
54
See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 121, 122–23, 137 (2001) (depicting the takeover wars as a one-time
only reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as deregulation, globalization, and new information and communications technologies, with
financial markets showing a temporary comparative advantage over management
in undertaking the structural adjustments made necessary by the changes but
not necessarily a permanent shift of the locus of production decision-making from
within the firm to outside markets).
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“entrepreneur” was replaced by a new one; if the transfer was
voluntary and defensive, no replacement occurred. Either way,
the manager of the restructured firm made production decisions independently from the price system, albeit often from a
situation of enhanced constraint due to a debt burden.55
Activist interventions are thought to be smaller in size and
less threatening than were hostile tender offers. A control
change is rarely implicated, with the activist working with the
present team rather than throwing it out. But a larger threat
lurks behind the smaller numbers. As the cost of engagement
falls, the numbers of both hostile intervenors and actual and
potential targets expand. The business planning threat becomes generalized. To make this point more clearly, we apply
a game theoretic gloss to the fact pattern. We begin this
description by distinguishing between two different kinds of
market influence over production decisions in the new era. In
the first, no activist has appeared but intervention is
threatened; in the second, activist intervention has occurred.
Case 1: Investors are not yet active. In this case, the manager
knows that if she “disappoints” the market, an activist will
show up and likely behave in an antagonistic manner—
whether by advancing shareholder proposals, by publicly
criticizing the company and demanding change, or by threatening to wage a proxy fight in order to gain board representation. Failure to reach an agreement with the activist means
that the proxy fight will materialize. (Takeover bids are sometimes threatened but rarely seen in practice.56) Most such
contests result in activist success. As a result, rational managers will anticipate the activists’ demands and make the
production decision the market prefers. For example, if activists demand (on average) a lower level of research and
development and capital expenditure along with increased
leverage, managers will amend production and financing policy accordingly.
Case 2: Activist intervention. In this case, the market, or,
more specifically, a hedge fund as representative of the market, itself makes production decisions. Indeed, the arrival of
55
Significantly, constraining super-high leverage did not persist as a business norm. Post-takeover era leverage levels were higher than pre-takeover levels
but not so high as to denude management of discretion to reinvest free cash flows.
Id. at 127–32, 136–37.
56
There is no question that activism prompts mergers, but the acquirer is
almost always a third party. See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev &
Anil Shivdasani, Activism Mergers, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 54, 58–59 (2017) (showing a
takeover bid occurring in 24 percent of the engagements—from third parties in
19.9 percent and from the activist itself in 3.4 percent).
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an activist typically results in a negotiated settlement pursuant to which management either makes concrete business
concessions or agrees to put the activist’s representatives on
the board.57

In both Case 1 and Case 2 (although with different intensity) acceding to the preferences of the potential or present
activists reduces the manager’s risk of removal or diminished
influence. Borrowing from game theory, the situation can be
characterized as an extensive game in which the manager plays
first (by choosing the production plan) and the investors play
second (by choosing whether or not to intervene). In this
game, there is only one equilibrium, one in which the manager
chooses the investment plan the market likes so that the investors remain inactive. That is, the manager anticipates and
adopts the market’s preference, effectively putting the market
in charge of production decisions.58
Of course, actions out of the equilibrium path are possible.
Some managers will resist by simply failing to take preemptive
steps. More likely, managers who believe their business plans
to be robust but who fear a negative market response will take
proactive and defensive steps to garner support by institutional
investors. This is called “shareholder engagement.”59 Yet the
point of our stylized representation of an equilibrium path in
which concession is the only rational course remains, and it
underscores the magnitude of the power shift. Authority over
corporate affairs has shifted away from the board of directors to
57
William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1402–08 (2007).
58
Management concession to the demands of activist hedge funds can be
framed as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). SPE is the concept that restricts
the number of (Nash) equilibria that may result in a strategic-form game (that is, a
game represented with matrices). See generally MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME
THEORY 252–57 (2103) (analytically treating SPE as a refinement of equilibrium in
extensive-form games); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT
183–85 (1991) (same).
59
Large institutional investors like BlackRock and Vanguard, which profess
an interest in promoting long-term investment, insist that CEOs make direct
contact and explain their strategies. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016
U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4–6 (Nov. 28, 2016), https://
www.sullcrom.com/2016-us-shareholder-activism-review-and-analysis-activists-face-headwinds-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/3VLJ-76FN] (describing efforts
by Blackrock, Vanguard, and other large institutional investors to encourage
companies engage them directly). While cooperatively disposed, these investors
also use the threat of intervention to bring themselves into the corporate decisionmaking process on a going concern basis, with the justificatory burden falling on
the managers in tandem with the burden to garner affirmative shareholder
support.
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the investors themselves, while the insulated hierarchy of the
mid-twentieth century is finally eclipsed in practice.
II
MARKET COORDINATION UNDER GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
THEORY
Under the market control paradigm, shareholder empowerment is a good thing because it reduces agency costs and gives
properly incentivized actors a determinative role in business
planning. Shareholder control enhances productivity because
the directives are market driven, and markets are intrinsically
superior to institutions as coordinators of production.60 This
is the majority view.
A minority argues for a more cautious approach, raising
the possibility of negative trade-offs and asking pointed questions about the newly empowered shareholders’ incentives and
the reliability of the market mechanisms through which their
interventions are channelled.61 These objections and questions tend to be dismissed as expedient, following not from
economic theory but from either of two parochial agendas. One
is refractory managerialism—the objectors pursue the management agenda and ultimately seek legislative interventions that
would cut off the channels facilitating shareholder intervention
much as did antitakeover legislation a generation ago.62 Alternatively, the objections are dismissed as a progressive ploy.
The hidden objective is the displacement of shareholder value
maximization as the corporate objective by a stakeholder
model, with redistribution rather than productivity as the true
motivation.63
In fact, the objections have a powerful grounding in economic theory whatever their proponents’ political coloration.
But the objections’ theoretical legitimacy goes unrecognized be60

See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 865, 874.
Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1283–92; William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
677–78 (2010); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 135–40 (2016); Zohar Goshen & Richard
Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 767, 778–85 (2017); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses
Decrease Shareholder Wealth?: The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 845, 847–56 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine:
Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 718–21 (2015).
62
See Bebchuk, supra note 51; Roe, supra note 51, at 1003–04.
63
J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 364–65
(2017).
61
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cause the supporting line of economics—general equilibrium
theory—has never successfully undergone an interdisciplinary
transfer from microeconomics to law and economics and corporate legal theory. A second dose of theoretical instruction is
overdue. A proverbial gap needs filling. This Part begins to
correct this omission by introducing GE to corporate governance for the first time,64 and by demonstrating its destabilizing
implications for the majority’s presumption favoring market
coordination. Part III will then move to discuss GE’s positive
implications for the legal corporate form and shareholder
empowerment.
Subpart II.A fills in the theoretical background. It first
goes back to the source of legal theory’s market coordination
norm, describing the first and second theorems of welfare economics. Next, the discussion traverses the distinction between
general and partial equilibrium modelling and shows how a
legal theory that incorporates the market coordination norm by
reference to partial equilibrium results—such as the J-M
agency model—is intrinsically unsound.
Subpart II.B turns to the fundamental Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model and its implicit promise that markets
can be shown to be efficient coordinators of the economy. We
then show how GE models subsequent to Arrow-Debreu failed
to make the promised showing. GE was a great normative
project motivated by the desire to validate market control, but
it foundered on multiple, unstable equilibria and the unsolvable problem of market incompleteness.
A. From Partial to General Equilibrium
Legal theory’s norm favoring market coordination is extrapolated from the first and second fundamental theorems of
welfare economics. The first fundamental theorem holds that
when supply and demand for a product constitute a competitive equilibrium, the allocation of the product among consumers is Pareto optimal; that is, it is impossible to make one
consumer better off without making another worse off.65 The
theorem amounts to a formal statement of Adam Smith’s invisi64
The introduction has been made previously, as regards securities regulation, see Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 120 (2015); and financial
contracting. Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered
Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 496–503 (2000).
65
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 326.
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ble hand66—the powerful idea that self-motivated individuals,
coordinated only by the price system, can act in mutual
compatibility.67
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics
holds that any allocation of goods that is Pareto optimal can be
the outcome of a competitive equilibrium, after an appropriate
lump-sum redistribution of initial endowments. In English, if
an efficient allocation of goods is desired, a benevolent state
planner can redistribute wealth from consumer A to consumer
B and then let the price system generate the efficient outcome.68 This implies that problems of efficiency and distribution can be separated and makes a negative suggestion
regarding state intervention in the economy. Since the market
can get the economy to the efficient production frontier, redistribution of wealth is the only justification for governmental
intervention.
Thus stated, the first and second theorems do indeed support the law and economics norm favoring market coordination. But, as we will see in subpart II.B, the support only
follows under the strict conditions that delimit the formal models underpinning the theorems. Corporate legal theory, however, ignores these conditions. Instead, it relies on a
particularization of the first fundamental theorem in the J-M
agency model (combined with the efficient market hypothesis of
financial economics).69 The model assumes that management
moral hazard is the firm’s only unsolved problem—that is, but
for management moral hazard, corporate production and investment would realize a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium—and applies contractual and market controls to
minimize agency costs.
The narrow analysis of agency theory is typical of partial
equilibrium models. For a comparison, consider the partial

66
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 421 (Cannan ed., 1904), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-weatlh-of-nations-cannan-ed-vol-1
[https://perma.cc/NT2Z-GQER].
67
John Geanakoplos, Arrow-Debreu Model of General Equilibrium, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 119 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). The
coordination that takes place through the price system is only implicit, as consumers are price-takers even as their preferences determine the set of prices in
the aggregate. In the literature, to emphasize the coordination function of prices,
prices are also termed as signals.
68
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 326–27.
69
See supra note 38.
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equilibrium analysis of the pricing of goods,70 which is a mainstay of antitrust analysis. This exercise deals with the market
for a single good and determines the market’s equilibrium outcome in isolation from all other markets and prices, which are
held to be fixed. As in the J-M agency model, the exercise
proceeds on the assumption that “all other things [are]
equal.”71 The market under study does not interact with the
rest of the economy and has no external effects. Nor do
changes in the prices of other markets affect consumer wealth
and thereby influence the demand for the good in the market
under study.72
GE, in contrast, is a general equilibrium model. The distinction, elided in law and economics, is fundamental in economics itself. Unlike partial equilibrium analyses, a general
microeconomic theory is constructed from primitive concepts
and minimal assumptions and tries to explain phenomena
from a general perspective. That is, in a general equilibrium
framework, the equilibrium concept sweeps in all markets simultaneously and incorporates their interactions,73 looking at
the economy as a closed and interrelated system in which we
simultaneously determine the equilibrium values of all variables of interest.
The narrow J-M construct grew as it came to be applied in
less rigorous legal contexts, becoming more general and taking
on a deep normative coloration. E-F extended the palette of
market controls to include, inter alia, shareholder intervention
by hostile takeover. The later post-takeover extension of E-F
took an additional step, assuming unacceptably high residual
70
Partial equilibrium analysis is also known as Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 269–75
(8th ed., reprinted 2013) (pioneering the study of partial equilibrium).
71
See STARR, supra, note 6, at 3.
72
MARSHALL, supra note 70, at 343.
73
Ross Starr clarifies the importance of cross reference with an illustration
from the domestic automobile industry, which experienced a sudden downturn in
2005 that continued through the financial crisis. The shift in consumer demand
had nothing to do with the car companies’ production methods or the quality of
the product. It had to do with the price of oil, which rose sharply and stayed high.
High oil prices meant high gasoline prices, which caused consumers to shift to
fuel efficient cars. Unfortunately, the domestic manufacturers had been concentrating on highly profitable but gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles, and so took a
beating when shifts in the natural resources market caused preferences to
change. Says Starr: “Because there are distinctive interactions across markets
(e.g., among the price of oil, the price of gasoline, and the demand for SUVs) it is
important that the equilibrium concept include interactive simultaneous determination of equilibrium prices across markets. The concept can then represent a
solution concept for the economy as a whole and not merely for a single market
artificially isolated.” STARR, supra note 6, at 4–5.
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agency costs and looking to regulation to jumpstart new market controls. But real generality has never been achieved. The
framework of reference always hews to J-M’s initial assumption
that agency cost reduction—and hence greater shareholder influence—always enhances efficiency because all other things
are equal and efficient.
It bears noting that other partial equilibrium models
problematize shareholder influence, suggesting that it might
involve negative trade-offs. These tradeoffs were first introduced in the late 1980s when Jeremy Stein posited that myopic
management responses to shareholder-driven stock market
pressures could sacrifice value.74 Stein’s model shifts the locus of imperfection from management moral hazard to another
set of asymmetric information—that shareholders know less
than managers when it comes to corporate affairs—and then
endogenizes management investment decisions in anticipation
of future hostile shareholder action. Inefficiencies result.75
Both the analytical constructs in J-M and Stein are quite
realistic even as they lead to opposing outcomes regarding
shareholder power. But how is one to choose which model is
“right”? How can we normatively choose one model over the
other? We argue that we cannot. Both models should be seen
as useful examples. They are potentially powerful as such, for
examples can highlight logical shortcomings in normative arguments. But when a particular example is not robust to
counterexample—as in the case of the J-M and Stein models—
it cannot provide the basis for a normative theory. Corporate
legal theory, however, is oblivious to this result; instead, it
takes J-M’s brilliant example and deploys it as a normative
theory of corporate governance.
The turn toward empirical testing in both financial economics and academic corporate law bespeaks discomfort with
the unsatisfactory state of the theory. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the accumulating factual findings will cure the market control paradigm’s theoretical infirmity by proving that
shareholder empowerment always enhances welfare. Corporate decision-making tends to be endogenous. Empirical inquiry into its causes and effects accordingly presents
identification problems that make it possible to mistake corre-

74
See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 61–62; Stein, Efficient Capital
Markets, supra note 7, at 667.
75
Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 64–67.
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lation for causation.76 We generally lack exogenous events that
we can use to mitigate the problem. Moreover, we lack a measure that can globally capture firm value rather than just
shareholder value, which disables the use of empirical testing
to support propositions about aggregate welfare. Finally, even
if we assume that the stock price provides a reliable proxy for
firm value (in the sense of aggregate welfare), we could not be
sure that short-term observations proxy for long-term value.
Analysis of long time-series is difficult, for it only rarely happens that one has sufficient data and time variation to make
the analysis credible.77
None of this implies that partial equilibrium models are so
constrained as to be useless nor that the empirical project is a
failure. It just means that one’s expectations should be limited—partial equilibrium models and empirical testing help us
understand what happens at a local (as opposed to general)
level when a few variables are changed. Normative propositions, however, presuppose a rigorous general equilibrium
analysis of the problem at hand.78 This means that only GE
studies can aspire to normative implications. We turn to those
studies next.
B. A Primer on General Equilibrium (GE)
1. The Arrow-Debreu Model
The Arrow-Debreu (A-D) model, derived in 1954,79 was the
first rigorous (that is, formulated in a purely mathematical
form) demonstration of the first and second fundamental theorems in a general equilibrium setting. It is thus the cornerstone of GE theory and normative economics.80
76
Compare K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 423
(2017), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards,
78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 409–11 (2005) (presenting opposite results on staggered
boards and firm value, addressing relevant identification issues differently, with
the difference in treatment largely explaining the different results).
77
See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 61, at 91.
78
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 343.
79
See Arrow & Debreu, supra note 11.
80
GE (in general) is concerned with allocation of commodities across time
and under uncertainty, while the A-D model studies the allocations that can be
achieved through the exchange of commodities at one moment in time. Accordingly, proving the results in the A-D model is a necessary condition for any further
development in GE. In other words, if the model does not work in the A-D description, a fortiori the model does not work with uncertainty and over time. See
Geanakoplos, supra note 67, at 116. For an historical account of general equilibrium theory, see BRUNA INGRAO & GIORGIO ISRAEL, THE INVISIBLE HAND: ECONOMIC
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 295–98 (1990).
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Specifically, the A-D model derives a competitive equilibrium that connects (1) the pricing of multiple (but finite) numbers of commodities (each of which has a quantifiable and
directly measurable price), with (2) the production of the commodities by firms possessing technologies, and (3) the consumption of commodities by consumers possessing
endowments of tradable equity securities in all firms in the
economy. Restated, the model shows that in a competitive
equilibrium, demand and supply simultaneously determine
prices, so that the marginal rate of substitution for consumers
(i.e., the amount of a good that the consumer is willing to give
up for another good) and the marginal rate of transformation
for firms (the amount of a good that must be sacrificed in order
to produce an additional unit of another good) are equal to
relative prices.81 General competitive equilibrium thus allows
for the greatest diversity in goals and resources.82 Under it,
“[e]very desire of each consumer, no matter how whimsical, is
met by the voluntary supply of some producer. And this is true
for all markets and consumers simultaneously.”83
This result, however, relies on Herculean assumptions. To
begin with, an equilibrium can only be “competitive” when all
firms are profit maximizing, all consumers are utility maximizers, and there is neither excess demand nor excess supply for
each good.84 In addition, markets are assumed to be “complete,” meaning that there is a market for each good in the
economy,85 information is symmetric (no one knows more than
81
What matters in the model are the relative prices, as the price level is
irrelevant. That is, for the GE analysis of two goods, whether the goods’ prices
respectively are 5 and 10 or 10 and 20 is irrelevant as the relative prices are the
same. LENGWILER, supra note 12, at 20.
82
See Geanakopolus, supra note 67, at 119.
83
Id.
84
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 314–15.
85
Id. at 314–15, 704. More particularly, the A-D model poses that technologies, endowments, and preferences depend on the state of the world, which provides a complete description of possible uncertain outcomes. To capture this
relationship, the model introduces state-contingent commodities—rights to receive a unit of a physical good if and only if a particular state of the world occurs.
In the model, titles to these state contingent commodities are transferred via
assets or securities. An asset is a right to receive physical goods at a future date
in an amount that varies depending on which contingent state occurs. A security
is a similar right paying cash instead of physical goods; an “Arrow security” pays 1
if a certain state occurs and 0 in all other states. The market completeness
requirement carries over to the Arrow securities—the model assumes that there
exists a market for every state-dependent contingency and that these markets
open before uncertainty is resolved. (This means that what is being purchased or
sold in the market for each contingent commodity is the commitment to receive or
deliver amounts of the commodity at hand.) Thus equipped, agents are unrestricted in their wealth transfers across states and their asset portfolio choices
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does anybody else),86 and all externalities are taken into account and priced (which, as a practical matter, means excluding externalities). All producers and consumers must also be
price takers; that is, they must be so small in relation to the
market that their actions do not affect it, denuding all actors of
market power.87 Further, consumer preferences, among other
things,88 must be “convex.” This means consumers have diminishing marginal rates of substitution and always prefer
mixtures of goods to extreme bundles (baskets including two
bundles of commodities are always at least as good as baskets
only including one of the two bundles).89 Last, producing firms
must have a diminishing marginal rate of transformation and
nonincreasing returns to scale.
2. GE’s Evolution
Subsequent GE models attempted to relax the A-D model’s
strict assumptions. In doing so, however, they ran into serious
problems concerning the competitive equilibrium’s uniqueness,
its stability and, most importantly, the completeness of
markets.90
First, a robust general equilibrium must be unique, for absent this quality, the theory lacks predictive power. To see
why, assume that, pursuant to the second fundamental theorem, a benevolent planner redistributes endowments in an A-D
economy and then sits back and lets the market reach a new
induce the same after-initial period consumption as in a world where uncertainty
is excluded. That is, complete insurance against uncertain and negative future
outcomes is achieved, allowing Pareto optimality to be reached. Id. at 704.
86
Id. at 550.
87
Id. at 314–15, 327.
88
Consumers are also able to ordinate their preferences without violating
transitivity (if I prefer x to y and I prefer y to z, I cannot prefer z to x) and
preferences are local nonsatiated, meaning that consumers prefer more than less
of a commodity. See id. at 42.
89
See Geanakopolus, supra note 67, at 117–18.
90
Conversely, GE models have successfully solved problems concerning the
existence of the competitive equilibrium. These problems arise due to excess
demand (the difference between demand and supply) and the aggregation of heterogeneous consumer preferences. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at
580–81. Inquiries into the existence of an equilibrium given excess demand reach
highly positive results. See Gérard Debreu, New Concepts and Techniques for
Equilibrium Analysis, 3 INT’L ECON. REV. 257, 257–58 (1962) (proving the existence
of competitive equilibrium under very general hypotheses without serious restrictions on the kind of the economy under description).
There is even an equilibrium when consumers fail to satisfy some of the basic
A-D assumptions on preferences. Andreu Mas-Colell, An Equilibrium Existence
Theorem Without Complete or Transitive Preferences, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 237,
238–39 (1974) (showing an equilibrium given noncomplete and nontransitive consumer preferences).
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equilibrium. If there are two possible equilibrium outcomes
(that is, the equilibrium is not unique) and one is more desirable than the other, the market might converge toward the
wrong one.91 Unfortunately, GE’s results on uniqueness have
been disastrous. Under the Sonnenshein92-Mantel93-Debreu94
theorem (also known as the “Anything Goes” theorem95), the
theory cannot get a grip on a characterization of aggregate
consumer demand, with the result that almost any continuous
pattern of price movements can occur. This has numerous
negative implications, including that the price system may fail
to provide a valid system of signals.96
Second, a robust general equilibrium needs to be stable.
To see why, assume that the market converges on a unique and
desirable equilibrium but that any minor random event can
dislodge the economy from this outcome.97 Instability thus
implies suboptimality. To predict a stable equilibrium, the theory has to show the process by which the equilibrium is
reached—the price adjustment mechanism. References to “the
magic of the marketplace” will not suffice. Stability, however,
has been established only under highly restrictive assump-

91
Frank Ackerman, Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting the Failure of
General Equilibrium Theory, in THE FLAWED FOUNDATIONS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC THEORY 16 (Frank Ackerman et al. eds., 2004).
92
Hugo Sonnenschein, Market Excess Demand Functions, 40 ECONOMETRICA
549, 560–61 (1972).
93
Rolf R. Mantel, On the Characterization of Aggregate Excess Demand, 7 J.
ECON. THEORY 348, 348 (1974).
94
Gérard Debreu, Excess Demand Functions, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 15, 15
(1974).
95
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 598.
96
See Alan Kirman, The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The
Emperor Has No Clothes, 99 ECON. J. 126, 27–32 (1989). Additional negative
implications include that: (1) as we do not know the excess aggregate function, we
could have multiplicity of equilibria; and (2) as we do not know the shape of the
aggregate function, we cannot do comparative statics and empirical work is subject to reverse causality problems. Id.
97
Id.
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tions.98 This has, again, important consequences,99 including
the inability of assuming that quick movement of prices implies
an equally quick attainment of equilibrium100 and the possibility of trading outside of the equilibrium, which in turn means
that the equilibrium eventually reached will be pathdependent.101
The third, fundamental, problem with A-D is that, even
given unique and stable equilibria, competitive equilibrium requires a complete set of markets. In complete markets, there
exists a complete set of state-contingent securities that allows
the buying and selling of claims on any good at every future
point of time and in all possible economic circumstances.102
Given this, agents can deal with uncertainty by insuring each
state separately, trading securities in such a way as to affect
the payoff in one specific state without affecting the payoffs in
other states, almost as if uncertainty did not exist.
A reasonable observer of the world quickly will conclude
that markets are not, in fact, complete. GE theorists explain
this by pointing to a familiar list of real-world imperfections.
First, there may be asymmetric information: one party may
have “hidden knowledge” of her skills or the quality of the services she performs, which leads to adverse selection, or she
may take “hidden actions” that are not observable to others,
98
See THORSTEN HENS & BEATE PILGRIM, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FOUNDATION OF
FINANCE 83–84 (2002) (discussing other cases where it is possible to establish
uniqueness, such as an economy with only one representative consumer or in
which the distribution of endowments is already Pareto efficient); Kenneth J.
Arrow, H.D. Block & Leonid Hurwitz, On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium II, 27 ECONOMETRICA 82, 86–93 (1959) (proving the stability of the equilibrium
only by imposing the restrictive assumption of gross substitutability for commodities). Arrow and Hahn attempted to formalize the price setting process only to
conclude that “it would be quite wrong to conclude that the price mechanism
works from a demonstration of stability.” KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 282 (1971)
99
Frank Hahn summarized the results of the inquiry on stability as follows:
“There is at present no satisfactory axiomatic foundation on which to build a
theory of learning, of adjusting to errors and of delay times in each of these. It
may be that in some intrinsic sense such a theory [of stability] is impossible. But
without it this branch of the subject can aspire to no more than the study of a
series of suggestive examples.” Frank Hahn, Stability, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 745, 747 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds.,
1982).
100
Franklin M. Fisher, The Stability of General Equilibrium—What Do We
Know and Why is it Important?, in GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: A CENTURY AFTER
WALRAS 35, 37 (Pascal Bridel ed., 2011).
101
Id. This further implies that it is very risky to plan a particular economy
and then decentralize it using markets. Id.
102
See supra note 85.
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which leads to moral hazard.103 Moral hazard, in turn, may
limit the availability of credit, which chills the creation of asset
markets.104 Second, there are limits on actors’ abilities to project the future. Some events are inconceivable;105 projections
of predictable events are impaired by “bounded rationality,”
which are limits on ability to calculate optimal strategies.106
Third, the cost of establishing and specifying a particular asset
market might not be covered by the profit earned by the entrepreneur who opens the market.107 Transaction costs or other
frictions may also inhibit the access to the market by the population of traders who otherwise would make use of it.
The results of studies of the impact of market incompleteness are not encouraging.108 The studies show that with incomplete markets, there is a commitment problem that may
lead to a coordination failure: when a market is missing, consumers are disabled from making forward commitments. The
lack of commitment in turn negatively impacts the producers,
leading to suboptimal outcomes.109 Other studies fail to yield
equilibria at all110 and still others show that the opening of a
new market, which reduces the quantum of incompleteness,
can in fact make everybody worse off.111
103
See Jean-Jacques Laffont, A Brief Overview of the Economics of Incomplete
Markets, 65 ECON. REC. 54, 55–56 (1989). In addition, symmetrically available
information may be nonverifiable. See id.
104
See John Geanakoplos, An Introduction to General Equilibrium with Incomplete Asset Markets, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 1, 2 (1990).
105
Laffont, supra note 103, at 55.
106
Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 2 n.1; MAGILL & QUINZII, supra note 20, at
13.
107
Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 2.
108
Much of GE assumes market incompleteness and consequently gives up on
the achievement of Pareto optimality. A less demanding criterion, constrained
Pareto efficiency, is substituted. This defines the optimality of markets relative to
the limited ability of agents to redistribute income across future contingencies.
See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 7; MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 710.
That is, the result is optimal relative to the set of allocations that can be achieved
through the existing (incomplete) market structure. See Oliver D. Hart, On the
Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is Incomplete, 11 J. ECON.
THEORY 418, 419 (1975).
109
See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 4.
110
See John Geanakoplos & Herakles Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity,
and Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations When Markets are Incomplete, in 3 ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH ARROW 77 (Walter P. Heller, Ross M.
Starr & David A. Starrett eds., 1986). The authors consider an incomplete market
setting with real assets—markets are incomplete because the number of assets is
lower than the possible future states of the world. Id. at 70. However, one of the
assumptions needed in the model to obtain the equilibrium, which presupposes
the absence of arbitrage, is the very possibility of arbitrage. Id.
111
See Hart, supra note 108, at 439.
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Uniqueness and stability problems, combined with incomplete markets, denude the welfare theorems of much of their
predictive power. In the end, microeconomic theory does not
predict that competitive markets reliably coordinate the economy. This is the lesson of GE, a lesson that, as we explain next,
corporate legal theory can no longer ignore in the wake of the
rise of empowered shareholders.
III
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS
The public corporation, once described as a hierarchical
model of organization, has been reshaped into a more marketrun entity. To evaluate this shift of production decisions to
markets, we need to bring GE with incomplete markets to the
forefront of corporate legal theory.
We do so in four steps. In subpart III.A, we first show how
GE does positive work when applied to corporate governance,
helping to explain particulars of the legal corporate form and
expanding on Coase’s description of corporate production.
Subpart III.B then moves to GE’s implications for shareholder
empowerment, discussing its prediction that shareholder participation in business planning will be ridden with incentive
problems and lead to suboptimal results. Subpart III.C turns
to recent asset pricing theory and describes the theory’s lesson
that pricing based on objective valuation coexists in an incomplete market with pricing based on supply and demand, which
confirms the caution raised in GE about market-driven corporate production. Subpart III.D questions a contrasting picture
of efficient market completeness advanced by Ron Gilson and
Jeffrey Gordon.
A. GE and the Theory of the Firm
GE aspires to model an economy in which markets work so
well as to obviate the need for hierarchical organization. It is in
this sense a polar opposite to Ronald Coase’s transaction costbased explanation of hierarchical production.112 But, as we
have seen, the GE project stalled because the models showed
that markets, due to incompleteness and other problems, cannot accomplish complex production. It follows that once we
take incompleteness into account, GE becomes surprisingly
compatible with the Coasean perspective and even can be
112

See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
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drawn on to explain the basic elements of the legal model of the
firm.
Where Coase pointed to transaction costs in explaining
hierarchical coordination, GE, which posits that hierarchical
coordination would be unnecessary in complete markets,
would point to the factors that cause market incompleteness.
It thereby would repeat Coase’s transaction cost explanation
and go on to flesh it out, adding imperfect information and
limitations on ability to project.
In this reverse GE model,113 we can go on to explain the
notable features of the legal form of the corporation: locked-in
capital, transferable shares, limited liability, centralized management through a board of directors, and perpetual existence.
The law provides for these features to address problems that
arise out of market incompleteness. Conversely, in complete
markets, these features would be redundant; for given complete markets, prices would guide production decisions and the
system would have no need for centralized, hierarchical
planning.
Consider first capital lock-in, imposed by the legal form to
import stability by preventing individual shareholders (and
their creditors) from withdrawing capital contributions to meet
liquidity needs. In complete markets, there would be no stability problems, for individual liquidity needs would never impact
production planning because investors could buy a state-contingent set of securities providing full insurance against future
consumption shocks.114 Locked-in capital would be redundant. The same would go for transferable shares, which are
only necessary because capital is locked-in, providing a safety
valve for investors who need to monetize their investments to
meet consumption shocks. Limited liability would also not be
an equilibrium result under complete markets, as investors
could write a set of complete contracts specifying the level of
individual liability based on their risk preferences. Centralized
decision-making would be unnecessary because, as we will explain in subpart III.B, investors could directly run the firm and
always reach optimal unanimous decisions; for in complete
markets investors have the same information, perfect hedging
against future consumption shocks, and no collective action
113
We follow Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate
Law and Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 179 (2000), which shows the
explanatory power of the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis lies in illustrating why
capital structure irrelevance does not obtain in the real world.
114
See supra note 85.
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problems. Finally, given investor unanimity in complete markets, the requirement of perpetual existence would not matter,
for investors would make correct, unanimous decisions about
future commitments on a going-concern basis.
B. GE Models of Shareholder Decision-Making
Recall that the market control paradigm asserts that
shareholder governance makes sense because shareholders
have correctly aligned incentives and stock market pricing
holds out a robust informational focal point. GE analysis
counters both assertions, predicting precisely the opposite.
1. Shareholder Incentives
Critically, in GE management hierarchies are assumed
away115 and the shareholders directly make the firm’s production decisions, with the shareholder population simultaneously
making up the economy’s population of individual consumers.
Within this analytical framework, the outcomes (efficient or
inefficient) of shareholder decision-making regarding production turn on the distinction between complete and incomplete
markets.
Given complete markets, all shareholders place the same
value on the firm’s future returns. This is because they can
deal with uncertainty by insuring their consumption preferences through a set of state-contingent securities that is equal
to the number of all possible future states of the world. In such
an environment, all shareholders will agree on a single plan of
production and investment that pursues the objective of maximizing the present value of the firm’s returns—a value that will
equal fundamental value and be manifested in the market price
of the firm’s securities.116 Market completeness thus fulfils a
necessary condition for the operation of the Fisher separation
theorem, under which a firm should increase its value to the
fullest extent regardless of the preferences of its owners.117
115
Management moral hazard accordingly does not figure into the risks
against which the market provide insurance, although it still figures in GE as a
source of market incompleteness. For an extension of general equilibrium analysis into environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems, see
Edward C. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard, 52 ECONOMETRICA 21 (1984).
116
John Geanakoplos, Michael Magill, Martine Quinzii & Jean Drèze, Generic
Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets are Incomplete, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 113, 121 (1990).
117
IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 141 (1930).
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With market incompleteness, however, the number of financial assets available to the actors to insure against uncertain future states of the world is less than the number of future
states. This means that the actors in the economy can only
insure their position by using currently available assets. GE
shows mathematically that under this condition market coordination cannot yield an optimal allocation of resources.118
The basic insight can be variously described. One approach focuses on limitations on the actors’ available information and ability to project. To see this, imagine that an
omniscient planner redistributes the economy’s resources at
an initial date.119 This change will directly affect the actors’
wealth in all possible future states. The change will also indirectly affect equilibrium prices at the future dates. The planner
can take into account the two effects simultaneously. Private
actors, in contrast, can consider only the direct effect on their
own wealth because, under the atomistic assumption, they do
not consider the general equilibrium effect on prices produced
by their actions, behaving as if the value of their assets would
not change.120 Inefficient allocations of resources result and
the actors end up being underinsured (or overinsured) against
future states of the world.121
Alternatively, one can focus on the actors’ limited ability to
transfer wealth across states (that is, for future consumption)
when markets are incomplete. For example, assume that there
are two actors who need to buy financial assets X and Y in
order to transfer wealth in states A and B (for insurance purposes), respectively. However, assume that there is no market
118

See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 26.
The standard approach of GE is to define an optimum on the assumption
that a planner—hypothetical omniscient, benevolent sovereign—can achieve that
result and then to verify that the optimum can be decentralized as a market
equilibrium. If the markets do not yield the optimal equilibrium allocation (or,
under incomplete markets, an equilibrium at all), the theory remits us back to the
planner.
120
BERNARD SALANIE´ , THE MICROECONOMICS OF MARKET FAILURES 212–13 (2000).
121
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium, 49
REV. ECON. STUD. 241, 242 (1982).
With a complete set of risks markets, we know we wish to equalize
the marginal rates of substitution between any two states for all
individuals. With an incomplete set of markets, we cannot do this,
but we may be able to have a more “efficient” distribution of risks
(come closer to equalizing, on average, the marginal rates of substitution) if we can change the price distribution (and thus the “profit
distribution”) associated with the risky asset. The government recognizes that it can change this price distribution by altering the
allocation of investment and the ownership shares in the different
assets. The market ignores this effect.
119
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for X and Y, because markets are incomplete. In response, the
actors will buy the available asset Z to the same purpose. As a
result, the price of Z will rise too high and the actors will be
unable to transfer wealth across states efficiently. In other
words, in incomplete markets individuals are not optimally coordinated by the price system and may direct excessive resources toward their state of relative deprivation, without
considering the effect (that is, the pecuniary externality122)
they impose on others when they trade (such as a higher security price).
The combination of insufficient insurance against uncertain future states of the world and the shareholders’ different
marginal propensities to consume (some want more in the near
future while others are more patient) creates a problem when
shareholders govern directly. The question is whether, given
heterogeneous consumption preferences, the shareholders will
choose the most valuable investment project.
In some situations, GE answers yes. If investors can ascertain the project’s value by reference to currently traded securities, which are assumed to reflect the value of the projects of
other firms in the economy,123 and the project is very small as
regards the economy as a whole, the project, in the parlance of
GE, is “spannable,”124 and the shareholders can be expected to
make an undistorted choice. Notwithstanding heterogeneous
consumption preferences and the lack of full insurance, Fisher
separation will still occur—the shareholders will unanimously
approve the value maximizing result and each traded security
will accordingly have a unique equilibrium price.125
GE, however, counsels this will not be the usual result.
Most projects do not satisfy the spanning condition, because
one cannot extrapolate a certain projection from existing as122
As an application consider the case of fire sales. If the agents acted cooperatively (a condition which contradicts competitive markets), they could reduce the
negative effect of fire sales. From a GE perspective, fire sales create a pecuniary
externality that is not internalized by the price system, because what each agent
expects to lose upon the occurrence of a “bad” state is less than what the economy
as whole expects to lose. See generally Guido Lorenzoni, Inefficient Credit Booms,
75 REV. ECON. STUD. 809 (2008) (showing how the conjunction of the combination
of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are
determined in a spot market generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts).
123
See Oliver D. Hart, Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium, 16 J.
ECON. THEORY 53, 54 n.3 (1977) (“[E]very feasible production plan of every firm can
be expressed as a linear combination of the existing production plans of firms in
the economy.”).
124
Or, in the alternative, it satisfies the “spanning condition.”
125
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 714–15.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt

710

unknown

Seq: 36

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-AUG-20

14:14

[Vol. 105:675

sets. Indeed, when a firm’s investment project is different from
those currently offered in the economy—for example, because
it involves a new technology or the production of new goods or
services—currently traded assets can no longer be relied upon
to ascertain the value of the new project. Problems ensue.
First, the only way for a shareholder to value the project is to
apply her own understanding of the working of the economy.
As different shareholders naturally see things differently,
“quoting” problems may follow. Second, when shareholders
lack full insurance and the spanning condition is not satisfied,
their heterogeneous consumption preferences do affect a project’s evaluation. The shareholders anticipate that once the
security reflecting the unspannable project starts trading, it
can be used to effect wealth transfers across actors in future
states (for insurance purposes). The wealth transfers in turn
affect supply and demand across the economy for all commodities, leading to a change in relative prices. The price change
leads to yet another redistribution of wealth. This in turn loops
back to the shareholders’ project selection: rational shareholders will look to the wealth allocation effect and the commodity
pricing effect in addition to the project’s fundamental value.126
Under these conditions, shareholder disagreement results
regarding project selection. Fisher separation is lost because
the goal of profit maximization becomes a matter of subjective
decision-making varying with the shareholders’ own visions of
the economy and idiosyncratic preferences regarding future
consumption. An individual shareholder’s insurance concerns
are not necessarily collinear with the goal of maximizing the
firm’s present value. The outcome will not be efficient127 and
security equilibrium prices might well be multiple rather than
unique.
Strategies for ameliorating the shareholder selection problem have been suggested in the literature. Drèze shows that it
is possible to replicate full insurance artificially through a bargaining mechanism.128 The logic is similar to that of Coasean
bargaining: shareholders can negotiate among themselves and
buy from each other a sort of insurance by receiving transfers
from the others (if you want me to vote for plan x, you have to

126

Geanakoplos et al., supra note 116, at 121.
Id. at 134–35.
128
Jacques H. Drèze, Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilibrium and Stability, in ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY
129–30 (Jacques H. Drèze ed., 1974).
127
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pay me transfer t).129 DeMarzo turns to blockholders to solve
the disagreement problem, showing that a dominant
blockholder with a financial incentive to move the firm to a
production plan that maximizes value can build a majority coalition.130 The outcome, however, presupposes face-to-face bargaining in a highly stylized boardroom.131
Both strategies improve the shareholders’ lot by bringing in
a holder owning a sufficient number of shares to align its interests with the optimal outcome and thereby avoid the incentive
misalignment of shareholders with small stakes. Both also interpolate a venue for face-to-face contracting among the shareholders, a requirement that severely limits their potential as
regards real world public companies. Ultimately, then, both
cast doubt on real world applications of shareholder power in
which the catalysts are shareholders holding relatively small
blocks of stock, such as hedge funds and other newly empowered shareholders.
2. Implications for Shareholder Governance
GE with incomplete markets sends warning signals regarding the recent power shift in the public corporation. It suggests
that there is no reason to presume that shareholder-directed
business planning is superior to board-directed business planning and any number of reasons to presume that a fiduciary
board, despite the moral hazard problem, will be better
incentivized.
A potential objection to this reference to GE models needs
to be addressed. Actors in GE models are risk averse. Corporate legal theory, in contrast, aspires to a risk neutrality model,
making reference to portfolio theory. If shareholders are risk
neutral, then they have no need for the risk insurance held out
129
Id. A platform for face-to-face trade is required. There is also a timing
problem. The production plan is chosen by new shareholders after shares have
been traded in the stock market. This condition, however, is difficult to meet in
the real world. For example, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, A Theory of
Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies, 47 ECONOMETRICA 293, 293
(1979), observe that this condition prevents the analysis from being extended to a
multiperiod model.
130
Peter M. DeMarzo, Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the
Dominant Shareholder, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 713, 719 (1993).
131
The board must have agenda control. Its members must either be shareholders themselves or act on behalf of certain shareholders. It must deliberate
with unanimity. Every member must have veto power. Finally, the members of
the board may bargain with each other over various proposals and negotiate
transfers between themselves to win acceptance of a proposal. Id. at 728.
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by complete markets132 and the distortions highlighted in GE
should not be expected to follow from real world shareholder
decision-making. The suggestion of risk neutrality arguably
strengthens with reference to current shareholding patterns.
Less than one-third of publicly traded shares are held by retail
investors—the investors who most closely resemble the consuming citizens modelled in GE. The institutions that hold
most of the stock readily come forth as candidates for characterization as risk neutral.
The risk neutrality picture dissipates on closer inspection,
however. Portfolio theory does not posit that economic actors
are risk neutral, quite the contrary. It asserts that investor risk
aversion should be addressed in portfolio selection by including a greater proportion of risk-free treasury securities rather
than by including less risky stocks. There follows a theorem of
separation between subjective risk preferences and investment
decisions,133 a theorem that carries over to management investment decision-making on the assumption that diversified
shareholders are risk neutral as regards holdings in particular
companies. Retrograde governance implications follow. Full
diversification implies rational apathy as regards governance
issues at particular companies and so leads to another kind of
separation—the separation of ownership and control.
Shareholder empowerment follows from a very different incentive template—that of a modern hedge fund manager rather
than that of a passive portfolio investor. The fund manager’s
incentives, both as regards equity purchases and sales and
governance inputs at particular companies, will be shaped by
multiple influences, including, inter alia, the fund’s compensation structure and the fund’s relational posture with its own
investors. Investor relations in turn imply pressure to yield
immediate and verifiable market-beating returns, particularly
to the extent the fund’s capital is not locked in. Given short
term lock down periods, the manager’s marginal rate of substitution between present and future will be very high. There
results a structural prediction that hedge funds will tend to be
more impatient than investors whose capital is locked in or
132
Similarly, in an exchange economy populated by infinitely-lived agents, it
has been shown that self-insurance effected through investment in risk-free securities can makes market incompleteness irrelevant, given also transitory
shocks, common utility functions, and limited trading in assets. See David K.
Levine & William R. Zame, Does Market Incompleteness Matter?, 70 ECONOMETRICA
1805, 1805–06 (2002).
133
See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 78–85
(8th ed. 2016)
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whose business model stresses diversification. Once the hedge
fund ascends to governance power, such selective incentives
will prevent Fisher separation at portfolio companies and can
lead to suboptimal investment decision-making.134
In sum, hedge fund activists can be susceptible to subjective influences. Their consumption preferences will be influenced, on the low side, by the need to cater to investor
preferences at the office and make tuition and mortgage payments at home, and, on the high side, by prospects for magnifying office influence and realizing aspirations for multiple
dwellings, trophies of art and sport, and philanthropical recognition. While a special breed of people, they are people all the
same and should be modelled as risk-averse rational actors.
Now recall Part I’s suggestion that contemporary shareholder intervention by hedge fund activists holds out a more
salient challenge to the hierarchical model of the corporation
than did the business planning disruptions of the takeover
wave of the 1980s. We here extend this analysis in light of GE’s
analysis of shareholder incentive misalignment, comparing a
contemporary hedge fund to a takeover era control purchaser.
Activist interventions are thought to be smaller in size and less
threatening than were hostile tender offers, for the activist
works with the present team rather than throwing it out. But
this has a flip side. The activist playbook implies a smaller
investment in the target than that undertaken by a successful
tender offeror. The activist accordingly presents a much more
severe problem of incentive misalignment. Relatively speaking,
a successful control purchaser is locked in because it can only
exit by a negotiated sale or a public offering—it is the functional equivalent of DeMarzo’s incentive compatible
blockholder. An activist, in contrast, makes sure to limit its
stockholding to a percentage amount low enough to leave open
an exit door to the existing trading market.135 The activist
buying 5 to 10 percent of the target’s stock thus has more

134
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 593
(2016) (opining that “wolf pack” teaming by activists results in excess
empowerment).
135
See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge
Fund Activists (Apr. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (American Finance Association 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787649
[https://perma.cc/2YVE-YDKV] (finding a mean activist block holding of 8.8 percent upon initial 13d-1 filing and a maximum accumulation mean holding of 12.4
percent).
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“optionality” than the control purchaser who invests in between 51 and 100 percent of the target.
There is also an externality problem. If the activist influences a firm’s investment policy and things turn out badly, the
activist can still exit readily. Control bidders of the takeover
era, in contrast, had to internalize the long-term consequences
of their production decisions. The reservation of easily accessible exit seconds the suggestion that activist-driven production
decisions will tend to be biased toward the short term, replicating the incentive problem modelled in GE. With activism,
“pure” investment incentives described in the market control
paradigm are nowhere to be seen.
C. Asset Pricing in Incomplete Markets
We have seen that, in incomplete markets, shareholders
make production decisions that accommodate their own consumption preferences and that this theoretical result resonates
strongly with real world hedge funds. A bias to production
decisions that boost short-term outcomes may indeed follow. A
question arises at this point about the role of the stock price.
Shareholder advocates rely on the EMH’s136 assurance of stock
price accuracy and posit that asset prices provide a robust
informational focal point, helping to address the asymmetry of
information between firm insiders and stock market outsiders.
Given semi-strong efficient pricing, shouldn’t we have a strong
circumstantial guarantee against such a skew in a governance
system that is stock market driven? The answer is no. Real
world stock prices routinely depart from fundamental value
and are open to influence from market-based events. This
analysis reverses the shareholder paradigm’s presumption of
pure financial incentives at a fundamental theoretical level.
Shareholder proponents refer to simple models of valuation
which teach that long-term value is impounded in the present
market price.137 But when these simple models confront incomplete markets and unspannable assets, the EMH result
disappears. In this environment, the firm’s profit maximization
is no longer objectively defined, shareholder disagreement may
occur in equilibrium, and security prices may fail to reflect
136
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 440–41 (the market price provides the “principal measure” of the shareholder interest).
137
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002).
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optimal production decisions. As a result, mispricing becomes
a concrete possibility.138
We will unpack the problems arising under the realistic
assumption of incomplete markets and unspannable assets in
three stages: first, we compare EMH to heterogeneous expectations models of stock pricing that assume incomplete markets;
second, we consider the implications of a basic source of market incompleteness, asymmetric information; and third, we
look at market power as another source of market incompleteness that introduces pricing distortions into the market on an
everyday basis.
1. Heterogeneous Expectations
The economics of heterogeneous expectations explains extreme variance between market price and fundamental value
that occurs in a pricing bubble. In this depiction, each investor
holds the same set of information but develops her own estimate of fundamental value, with some investors being more
optimistic than others. Note that this description assumes
market incompleteness and unspannable assets, under which
investors cannot value new projects by extrapolating projections from existing assets. Given either complete markets or
spannable assets, investors could only have homogenous
expectations.
More particularly, heterogeneous expectations models depict stock prices as having two components: first, the fundamental value of the stock; and second, an option which gives
the present owner the power to sell its stock to an even more
optimistic investor.139 The result is that, in equilibrium, the
stock price may exceed the fundamental value as optimistic
investors may be willing to pay a higher price for the stock
because of the option value of selling the stock to an even more
optimistic investor.140
138
See Pradeep Dubey et al., The Revelation of Information in Strategic Market
Games: A Critique of Rational Expectation Equilibrium, 16 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON.
105, 105–07 (1987).
139
For the original model, see J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J.
ECON. 323, 328–29 (1978). For a more recent treatment, see José A. Scheinkman
& Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1183,
1194 (2003).
140
The more pronounced the differences of opinion among investors, the more
salient the speculative element. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation
and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577,
578–80 (2006).
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There are several implications. First, the market price no
longer reflects the investment community’s consensus estimate of the fundamental value of the firm.141 This undercuts a
critical assumption made by the EMH—that competition
among rational investors causes prices to center around an
average of expected fundamental value.142 Second, the market
price is being driven by demand rather than by information, in
what amounts to short-term speculation. Third, to the extent
the resulting market overvaluation affects investment behavior
within the corporation, bad investments will result.143
Cognizable discrepancies between market price and fundamental value due to heterogeneous expectations are particularly likely to result in two situations. The first occurs when
“glamour” companies exciting investor optimism emerge in the
market, a situation associated with “momentum” investing.144
The second situation occurs when uncertainty runs high because a sector’s technology changes or newer businesses with
less established track records become an important part of the
market.145 In other words, price tends to depart from fundamental value when the project is unspannable, just as GE
predicts.
2. Information Asymmetries
Under the assumption of market incompleteness, the
EMH’s conclusion that long-term value is impounded in the
present market price is further problematized by information
asymmetries. While EMH models do not consider market incompleteness, they do acknowledge the relevance of asymmetric information between firm insiders and outsiders, by
distinguishing between a “strong” and “semi-strong” version.
Semi-strong EMH posits that the capital markets embed all
publicly available information in security prices.146 The limita141
See Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices:
Keynes vs. Hayek, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 539, 539–40 (2012)
142
Id.
143
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, at 711–12.
144
See Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts & Chester Spatt, Equilibrium Asset Pricing
and Portfolio Choice Under Asymmetric Information, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1503,
1529–32 (2010).
145
See Bolton et al., supra note 140, at 578–80; Stavros Panageas, The Neoclassical Theory of Investment in Speculative Markets 22–23 (Apr. 16, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=720464 [https://
perma.cc/F64D-NYS2].
146
See Malkiel, supra note 38, at 739, cited in JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE
ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 20 (1997). Semi-strong EMH has two implications: first, that no trading strategy based on public information can regularly
outperform the market, id. at 158, and, second, that insiders who possess non-
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tion to public information leaves semi-strong EMH coexisting
at peace with the proposition that undisclosed inside information can lead to significant under- and over-pricing in the
market.147
Semi-strong EMH does not, however, go on to explore the
distortionary possibilities, including inefficient investment policy,148 following from information asymmetries. Consider a
firm with an opportunity to take on an unspannable project—a
new, complicated, and very promising investment in a nonstandardized, innovative technology in which production requires firm-specific employee investment. Such a project is
likely to be mispriced in the stock market.149 There are two
reasons. First, information about the project’s long-term value
tends to be “soft”—that is, unverifiable by outsiders.150 Second, the project is likely to entail both a substantial present
commitment of capital and a long-time lag between the time of
investment and the time that returns from the project enhance
the firm’s periodic earnings reports. The result is a drop in
current earnings, a piece of “hard” information that pushes
down the stock price.151 Given managers who cater to the
stock price to minimize the risk of activist intervention, a good
investment opportunity is likely to be passed up.152
3. Market Power
Until recently, situations in which the market price departs
from fundamental value due to speculative demand by investors with market power (investors who are price makers, rather
public information can outperform the market when trading in their own stock.
See Dirk Jenter, Market Timing and Management Portfolio Decisions, 60 J. FIN.
1903, 1945–46 (2005); Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider
Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1692 (1992).
147
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, 691–94.
148
Id. at 698–703.
149
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of
Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 148, 148 (1990); Stein,
Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 63–67. Under some assumptions, the project
may well be undervalued—e.g., if investors in equilibrium believe the manager to
be a bad type. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1412–16 (2017).
150
See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 250 (2006) (defining “soft” information as that which “cannot be verified by the investors”).
151
Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some
Information Is Soft, 20 REV. FIN. 2151, 2152 (2016).
152
See M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J.
FIN. 1469, 1469–70 (1985) (showing that reputational incentives can lead to underinvestment); Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 7, at 667 (modeling
suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of nearterm stock prices and long run value).
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than price takers) were thought to be relatively rare. This view
is changing. Current research emphasizes that under heterogenous expectations and differential investor information, better-informed investors may rationally choose to exploit their
partly private information and act as price-makers rather than
price-takers by speculating on short-run price differences.153
The partial equilibrium model of Cespa and Vives offers a
particularly good example. It is an integrated model in which
the everyday stock market moves back and forth between informationally based and speculative pricing.154 They posit a rational expectations environment, long-term time horizons, and
residual uncertainty about asset values that varies in magnitude from company to company.155 They show that a static
market conforms to the prediction of EMH, with the price reflecting the investors’ consensus opinion regarding long-term
value. In a dynamic market, however, rational investors can
find it profitable to speculate on short-term price differentials.
Price now depends not only on the quality of the investors’
information but on their reaction to changes in aggregate demand.156 The latter can cause the price to move away from the
consensus figure. Given heterogeneous information, this nonconsensus price can lie farther from or closer to fundamental
value than would the consensus price.
At this point two additional factors come to bear: the degree of uncertainty respecting value and the magnitude of the
presence of liquidity traders. Given low uncertainty and trading following a random walk, the price will be aligned with
consensus as in a static market and there will be little incentive
to speculate on short-term price movement. We would be, in
effect, back at a spannable project. Given high uncertainty,
departures from the value consensus are more likely.157 Interestingly, momentum investing, which is triggered by new information, can push the price away from fundamental value even
as it reflects a consensus view of value.158 Ironically, the corrective—reversal of the overpricing stemming from trend chasing—comes from traders who act based on supply-demand
considerations.159 The bottom line assertion is this: whether
153

MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 715.
Cespa & Vives, supra note 141, at 540–41.
155
Id. at 540.
156
Id. at 541.
157
Id. at 540.
158
See Biais, supra note 144, at 1532 (showing how momentum can arise in
equilibrium).
159
Cespa & Vives, supra note 141, at 541.
154
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the market is moving forward with momentum or reverting, it is
the investors’ consensus opinions about future price movements rather than fundamental value that drive the price.160
Happily, the Cespa-Vives model predicts a reversion to fundamental value in the very long run. In the meantime, we no
longer can model a unitary shareholder. The shareholder disaggregates among short-term types, long-term types, information traders, and liquidity traders. There is accordingly no
basis for presuming that shareholder incentives are aligned
with maximization of fundamental value and hence that shareholder empowerment adds value. Instead, shareholder empowerment holds out plusses and minuses. GE, read together
with the asset pricing literature, inserts a warning into this
trade-off picture: the more powerful the shareholders become,
the more salient will be the negative effect of market inefficiency. The warning is especially loud whenever a corporation’s business plan involves valuation uncertainty. This is a
consistent message, whether one is considering GE, information asymmetries under semi-strong EMH, or asset pricing theory. It means that activism is most suited to twentieth century
brick and mortar producers and ill-suited to the younger, innovative companies on which depends the future of our national
economy.
None of this negates the basic conclusion of incentive theory that investors have an incentive to monitor and should use
the stock price in so doing.161 Having investors as monitors—
rather than as production decision-makers—is normatively desirable and not inconsistent with GE and its incomplete markets. Even as GE tells us that we cannot use market prices to
guide production decisions, the price system still provides useful information with which to monitor corporate decision makers. For example, if prices are low for too long, we do get a
likely signal that something is wrong. The operative assumption—which is consistent both with GE with incomplete markets and contemporary asset pricing theory—is that prices over
time converge to fundamental value. It follows that while
prices cannot provide guidance on prospective production decision-making, they can be useful for the ex-post monitoring of
corporate decisions.

160

Id. at 541–42.
See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 18–23 (2001)
(modelling shareholder monitoring incentives).
161
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D. Agency Capitalism Compared
We conclude our discussion in this Part by addressing the
different picture of markets advanced by Gilson and Gordon’s
agency capitalism analysis. Their analysis focuses on market
completeness and contrasts sharply with our application of GE
with incomplete markets. They argue, making implicit reference to the A-D model,162 that the markets have achieved completeness, thereby supporting a positive normative
presumption favoring shareholder empowerment precisely because it is market driven.163
Gilson and Gordon situate the power shift within a longerterm account of the evolution of interaction between capital
markets and governance institutions. The shift, they say, reflects a long-standing pattern: markets take the lead in adjusting to new developments, while institutions, weighted down by
frictions, anomalies, and path dependencies, catch up later.164
The facilitative market-based developments concern allocations of corporate risk, as to which capital markets in recent
decades have managed to achieve completeness, offering new
ways to transfer risk from firms to investors.165 Market innovations like junk bond financing, derivatives, and structured
finance over time have had a critical impact on corporate governance because they open up new ways of transferring corporate risk and permitting more leverage in capital structures.166
Stepped-up leverage in turn facilitates the emergence of the
new activist blockholders and a different alignment of corporate control.167 Between the hedge fund activists and the large
number of companies controlled by private equity firms, we
now have a permanent class of informed, institutional investors influencing business policy. Add this up, and you get a
claim for efficient, market-driven evolution.
Gilson and Gordon’s analysis picks up on a suggestion J-M
themselves made at the close of their famous paper, where they
discussed general equilibrium theory and the market incom162
In an earlier paper, Gilson on this subject explicitly connected the notion to
the A-D model, citing it as “[t]he theoretical framework for the implications of
complete capital markets.” See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 232 n.7 (2008).
163
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 865–68, 874.
164
Id. at 873. With this compare the analysis of Holmstrom and Kaplan,
supra note 54.
165
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 868.
166
Id. at 870–71.
167
Id. at 870–71, 872 n.30.
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pleteness problem. J-M expressed dissatisfaction with the
literature’s accumulation of inefficient outcomes. So, instead
of just assuming market incompleteness as in GE, the time had
come to take action: economists needed to ascertain the causes
of incompleteness and formulate a positive analysis of the supply of markets, highlighting conditions conducive to the creation of real world markets.168 Gilson and Gordon make a
follow-up observation: J-M’s market completion project has
been carried out in history and completed successfully. The
notion is intuitive: more is better than less, so the longer the
menu of risk-sharing securities, the better the market satisfies
individual preferences, and the stronger the economy.169
Even so, the notion is not GE. Indeed, GE views the process of opening new markets with suspicion. Hart showed
mathematically in an incomplete market setup that the opening of a new market triggered a new equilibrium that made
everyone worse off.170 The result has been replicated and generalized.171 And, in any event, we do not think that the investment community’s recent attribution of value to the
shareholder franchise has a market-completing effect. Aggressive use of the franchise does diminish the negative effects of
management moral hazard and so ameliorates an imperfection.
It thereby may (or may not) create value, but it does not add a
market. In fact, shareholder empowerment arguably entails an
increase in market incompleteness because it turns intermediary moral hazard into a potential problem for the first time.
When the shareholders were disempowered, the in168

The exact quote from J-M reads as follows:
We are not suggesting that the specific analysis offered above is
likely to be sufficient to lead to a theory of the supply of the wide
range of contracts (both existing and merely potential) in the world
at large. However, we do believe that framing the question of the
completeness of markets in terms of the joining of both the demand
and supply conditions will be very fruitful instead of implicitly assuming that new claims spring forth from some (costless) well head
of creativity unaided or unsupported by human effort.
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 356–57.
169
See Hart, supra note 108, at 419 (“Our intuition tells us that the introduction of additional markets ought to make people better off in some sense.”).
170
Id. at 439–42.
171
See Ronel Elul, Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets Economies with Several Consumption Goods, 65 J. ECON. THEORY 43, 43
(1995). A suboptimal outcome, however, is not always inevitable—sometimes the
new market does make everyone better off. See Laurent Calvet, Martı́n GonzalezEiras & Paolo Sodini, Financial Innovation, Market Participation, and Asset Prices,
39 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANALYSIS 431, 431 (2004); David Cass & Alessandro Citanna,
Pareto Improving Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets, 11 ECON. THEORY
467, 467 (1998).
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termediaries’ incentives did not matter. With direct inputs into
production plans, intermediary incentives matter a lot.
The growth of intermediaries also implies enhanced intermediary power to influence stock market prices. Such is the
effect of ownership reconcentration. As predicted by Cespa and
Vives, the increase in market power potentially makes market
prices less accurate.172 When there are more possible equilibria out there in the future, it follows that the price prediction
function is performed with less accuracy.
Gilson and Gordon are correct when they point out that the
appearance of new devices for corporate risk-sharing and the
proliferation of new investment institutions, principally private
equity firms and hedge funds, have changed the nature of
shareholding. The changes do indeed reduce agency costs.
But they have not completed the markets. Full insurance regarding future states remains unavailable and the corporatelevel changes identified by Gilson and Gordon do not obviate
the results of GE models and deliver us to a world that realizes
Arrow-Debreu. There is accordingly no basis in economic theory for attaching an efficiency presumption.
IV
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Our analysis yields three major points:
(i)

As corporate ownership has become concentrated in the
hands of institutional and active investors, power has
shifted from managers to shareholders, vesting decisionmaking capability in the shareholders for the first time.
The shift appears to be permanent; there will be no return to the insulated hierarchical corporation.
(ii) Contrary to the general assumption that markets can
efficiently coordinate corporate production, GE predicts
that when shareholders make business decisions, equilibria are likely to be multiple and inefficient. This implies that shareholder intervention in business planning
imports a trade-off between positive effects due to containment of management agency costs and negative effects of market inefficiency.
(iii) Economic theory provides general results on how to organize firms separately from markets (the Coasean theory of the firm) and general results on markets (GE).
However, the shift of decision-making power to share172

See Cespa & Vives, supra note 141.
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holders transforms the corporation into a hybrid form
that straddles the firm and the markets.173

We now turn now to the legal ramifications of these points,
looking first, in subpart IV.A, at the negative normative message of GE for corporate governance, then turning, in subpart
IV.B, to the formulation of policy recommendations for corporate legal theory, and finally considering corporate law, as interpreted and enforced in Delaware.
A. The Negative Normative Message of GE
Like most law and economics scholars, we are consequentialist. We thus share the view that corporate law should assist
the maximization of aggregate social welfare.174 Our intervention, however, teaches that we cannot rely on normative indications derived from microeconomic theory to advance that goal.
This is unfortunate, for clear theoretical guidance makes life
easier. If microeconomics could provide a general theory of the
corporation—a theory offering robust results on the tradeoff
between agency costs and market inefficiency—a regulatory
template would follow readily. For example, if we had general
results on the welfare increasing properties of market coordination, then the consequential policy would be to forbid the
board to implement any defense against market intervention
and to accord enhanced governance powers to shareholders.
Similarly, if we had results globally favoring the corporation as
a centralized and insulated bureaucracy, the consequential
policy would be to give all the bargaining power to the board,
along with an unassailable right to adopt defensive measures.
We would in either case have a much better idea of where we
stand.
Unfortunately, however, public corporations have evolved
into hybrids. The analysis here shows that higher-order economic theory—GE with incomplete markets—fails to tell us
how to work through the trade-offs implicated by the hybrid
173
We note that Williamson posits an intermediate category. See Oliver E.
Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 180–81 (2002). But, in our view, today’s shareholder-directed public corporations are not the firm described in Williamson’s
intermediate category, but the firm described in his hierarchy category.
174
As put by Kaplow and Shavell, “Welfare economics . . . is consequentialist
in nature, because welfare economic assessments of legal rules depend (entirely)
on the effects of the rules. . . . [I]t is based (exclusively) on a particular set of
consequences, namely, those that bear on individuals’ well-being.” Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969 n.8 (2001).
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form.175 This does not mean that our analysis leaves nothing
on the table for corporate law and economics. The teaching is
negative, but important; it involves a presumption against proposals in favor of either shareholder empowerment, or, alternatively, management insulation. Both proposals lack support in
economic theory and have distortionary effects in practice.
While the economic theory of incentives does indeed assert that
agency cost reduction enhances value, GE denudes the assertion of policy salience when it shows that shareholder inputs
regarding production choices can have suboptimal results.
Contrariwise, a policy presumption against shareholder empowerment could be prima facie taken to follow from GE. A
closer look, however, reveals that management moral hazard,
which is indirectly modeled in GE as a source of market incompleteness, remains in the picture, similarly preventing an antishareholder presumption from arising.
The negative presumption makes law reform very hard to
justify. This conclusion bears devastating implications for the
law reform agenda articulated pursuant to the market control
paradigm—a list of legislative and administrative interventions
designed to jumpstart shareholder empowerment.176 The
agenda clearly needs to be shelved, and not only because it
lacks theoretical support. It also has been mooted by events.
Shareholders are now empowered in fact and need no regulatory assistance. The fact that power flowed to them in the
absence of root and branch law reform is telling.177 It turns out
175
In philosophy, the term “theoretical reason” is used to refer to a standpoint
of reflection that is directed at finding explanations for matters of fact. Jay R.
Wallace, Practical Reason, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., Summer ed. 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/
entries/practical-reason/ [https://perma.cc/W6Z7-EQHJ].
To search for explanations behind facts is to seek to answer normative questions that speak for or against particular conclusions one might draw about the
way the world is. That is, theoretical reason involves reflection with an eye to the
truth of propositions, to the ultimate end of building a system of norms regulating
beliefs. In the current corporate environment, however, we lack a theory that can
offer “truth propositions” that tell us the best way to structure the corporation ex
ante.
176
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, at 669–73.
177
This does not go to say that law reform has played no role in the shift of
shareholder-management power. It is just that the law in question is not corporate law but federal securities law. Two adjustments have played a significant
facilitative role. One went to the proxy rules, which do a lot of the heavy lifting
regarding the shareholder franchise. In 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) modified the rules so as to permit short slates. See Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,289 (Oct. 16,
1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4). The modification long antedated hedge
fund activism, but, when the occasion finally arose, opened a process door for
hostile engagement short of control transfer. The second change came in 2003,
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that the system was never as embedded as the shareholder
paradigm predicted.
B. From Market Control to Off-Market Contracting
Given the lack of a clear normative theory for the new hybrid corporation, the question is what alternative palliative
microeconomic theory offers to corporate legal theory. We answer that one needs good incentives prodded by effective contracts. Given incomplete markets, economic theory counsels
that contracting that directs incentives in the proper direction
is a more promising route to productive efficiency than is market control. There follows a second presumption in favor of
private ordering, as the means to enable market actors to adequately address the specific tradeoffs between agency cost and
market inefficiency.
While it is hard to make predictions on the directions that
manager-shareholders’ private bargaining will take, our private
view, supported by recent empirical evidence,178 is that bargaining for additional insulation from shareholder attack
clearly will be value-enhancing at some companies some of the
time. To this end, there is already a toolbox of devices individual companies can include in their charters—staggered
boards, supermajority voting provisions, and tenure voting
schemes. We expect the collection to grow in coming years as
the inevitable outcome of off-market contracting in the wake of
shareholder empowerment and predict that structural reform
will occur at individual companies.
Corporate actors may not yet fully appreciate the negative
possibilities held out by the trade-off between agency costs and
when the SEC imposed on investment advisors a duty to vote portfolio shares on a
considered basis and in the beneficiary’s best interests. See SEC Proxy Voting by
Investment Advisors, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, Release No. IA-2106 (Mar. 10, 2003). This
mandate deprived management of a built-in base of voting support. It also enhanced the influence of informational intermediaries like ISS and Glass Lewis,
who met a sudden increase in demand for voting advice emanating from smaller
advisors for whom internal decision-making on voting was not cost effective. If we
set these adjustments against the broader background of corporate law and securities regulation, we see that shareholder empowerment required very little in
the way of a regulatory assist.
178
See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 61, at 100–08 (documenting an
increase in value after the adoption of a staggered board, especially in more
innovative firms, firms with more intangibles, and firms with more stable stakeholder relationships); William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 320–25 (2015)
(empirically documenting that in IPO firms, takeover defenses reduce the possibility that a change in control will harm the firm’s stakeholders, promoting more
favorable contracting terms and increasing firm value).
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market inefficiency. But the actors’ reaction sets and governance prescriptions can be expected to change as the set of
results expands and contractual settlements accumulate and
evolve. There already are signs that institutional investors are
taking a more nuanced view of activist intervention.179 Shareholder response patterns have changed in recent years. Proxy
contest outcomes no longer unilaterally favor activists.180
Large institutional investors, even as they invoke the rubric of
management “engagement” to get seats at the business planning table,181 also express support for the long-term plans of
companies against activist attacks and withhold support for
activists who primarily seek to force companies into share
buybacks and extraordinary distributions.182 We are hopeful
that boards of directors and institutional investors can learn
from experience and cooperate in implementing protections
against destructive intervention.183
179
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 59, at 4–6. This new trend on
the side of investors rejects a contractarian objection that our contractual approach is likely to invite—the “if there’s a problem they can just make a contract
and if they haven’t already done so there can’t be a problem” argument. Under
this argument, if shareholder power actually implicated inefficiencies, we should
expect to see contractual constraints on shareholder power to be in place already.
See Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 1683–84; Roe, supra note 51, at 987–89. However, while we are beginning to see these constraints, in an imperfect world one
need not expect the widespread adoption of contracts that limit shareholder
power to happen right away. There are path dependencies aplenty in the world of
corporate governance, not the least of them fixed views regarding the positive
productivity implications of shareholder inputs and the presence of influential
governance intermediaries with vested interests in those views’ continued prevalence. In short, the absence of more contracting to contain shareholders does not
imply that shareholder power is not a problem.
180
DuPont’s defensive victory in 2015 is the leading example. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, DuPont’s Victory: A Big Win for Ellen Kullman, but Activist Investors
Aren’t Finished, FORTUNE (May 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/13/dupont-ellen-kullman-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/2CQA-AAL8]
(describing how, after a four-month proxy fight, DuPont prevailed against activists
led by a billionaire hedge-fund manager).
181
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
182
This was in BlackRock chairman Larry Fink’s 2016 letter to CEOs. See
Ben McLannahan, Fink Backs New Breed of Shareholder Activism, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5f05b082-cbd3-11e5-84df-70594b
99fc47 [https://perma.cc/MM43-WAXN].
183
We anticipate an anticontractual objection: that the contracts in the firm
nexus are intrinsically incomplete and that therefore contract cannot be relied
upon to avoid inefficiencies. Tirole noted that there is a completeness question
bound up in his governance creation story but signaled that he did not think there
is a problem. See Tirole, supra note 161, at 14. A contingent control transfer can
be set up without a projection of all future contingencies. See Eric Maskin & Jean
Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD.
83, 84 (1999), which sets out a foundational critique to incomplete contracts
providing an irrelevance theorem. They make a very simple point: “If parties have
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Our recommendation for a presumption favoring private
ordering recalls the E-F contractarian paradigm of the 1980s.
But the similarity is more apparent than real.184 In E-F’s picture, market inputs assure efficient results from private contracting.185 Under GE, in contrast, private contracting offers a
corrective response to the inefficiencies arising in incomplete
markets. The notion is that governance terms grounded in
shareholder-manager contracting and business decisions
made within such a negotiated governance framework will be
superior to governance terms and business decisions resulting
from direct shareholder inputs in incomplete markets.
Superior, but not necessarily efficient. In bargaining theory, control goes to the party with the bargaining power
whether or not the outcome is optimal. It follows that the possibility of contracting does not preclude suboptimal outcomes.
More particularly, bargaining theory teaches that the disagreement point of the bargaining parties determines the outcome.
If one party has a disagreement point that is “too low” relative
to the other party, the counterparty will be in a position substantially to determine the outcome. As applied to the current
corporate scenario, this means that if, for example, a manager
fears removal from the activist investors, she will be more likely
to give in to any investor requests because the threat of removal
ensures that the manager has a low disagreement point.186 Yet
trouble foreseeing the possible physical contingencies, they can write contracts
that ex ante specify only the possible payoff contingencies.” Id.
184
We do, however, keep market constraints in the picture, as in E-F. Thus,
product markets can still be relied upon to import production discipline, the stock
market to facilitate investor monitoring of firm decisions, and the market for
management employment to lead to contracts that direct management incentives
in productive directions.
185
In E-F, this result comes from the combination of pure shareholder incentives, the claim of market price accuracy, and the reliance on a takeover corrective. See supra section I.B.2. We, of course, drop insistence on any of these
claims.
186
The leading partial equilibrium model of contractual corporate governance—Jean Tirole’s retelling of the J-M creation story—formally explores the possibility of suboptimal outcomes from shareholder-management bargaining,
concluding that shareholder-generated production decisions might be “biased.”
See Tirole, supra note 161, at 8–13. In Tirole, just as in J-M, the moment of
creation is the moment the entrepreneur takes the firm public, with the yield to
the entrepreneur and the firm rising or falling depending on the availability of
devices that reduce agency costs. Id. Tirole, however, extends J-M analysis,
describing shareholder monitoring in detail and bringing in control transfer. Id.
at 13–16. Once the possibility of control transfer comes into Tirole’s model, an
interesting thing happens: the need to raise capital at creation can lead the
founder-manager to give up control to the investors even though the investors will
make inefficient choices. Id. at 15. The shareholders seek to maximize their own
returns, which are not collinear with overall value maximization (exactly as pre-
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the opposite may also hold. For example, if a board successfully entrenches itself, it may instrumentally use defensive
measures to force decisions on shareholders.
Therefore, today’s challenge is to avoid systemic dominance by one contracting party—whether the managers or the
shareholders—and the inefficient distortion of the bargaining
process that results.
C. Delaware Adjudication and the New Hybrid Corporation
Our last prediction is that corporate law, as interpreted
and enforced in Delaware, is well suited to the mediation of
future bargaining between managers and empowered investors. Delaware courts have never imposed maximizing directives based on economic theory. Instead, they leave the basic
alignment of power between managers and shareholders to the
parties themselves and only review the bargaining process on
an ex-post, case-by-case basis when problems arise. Delaware
courts excel at this pragmatic exercise, drawing on a variety of
analytical devices in their decision-making, including common
sense, insights from economics, empirical results, historical
comparison, and logical inference. This excellence—and hence
Delaware’s superior ability to mediate shareholder-manager
conflicts—follows from a distinctive feature of the Delaware’s
judiciary system: the central role played by equitable
adjudication.
1. Delaware’s Equity Model
Modern equity has its historical roots in feudal England. It
reaches back to the time when the English Crown established
the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain187 to provide a
remedy in cases where parties would have suffered a wrong
because of the procedural rigidity or practical problems affectdicted by GE). The control transfer thus sacrifices enterprise value. In the model,
the only way the founder-manager can be insulated from suboptimal investor
interference is to have a sufficient ex ante base of capital that tilts the bargaining
power its way at the IPO contracting table. Id. at 16, 30.
187
See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1993). Equity
evolved in feudal England as a natural outgrowth of the King’s inherent power and
duty to do justice, as people could directly petition the King for aid when they
could not obtain adequate relief from a local court. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL.,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 18–19, 90–91 (2009). The office of the Chancellor, and then the Chancery
Court, developed by 1400 to alleviate the need for people to seek relief directly
from the King and his council. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power,
59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 226 (2018).
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ing the application of the common law.188 This emphasis on
providing relief suited to the circumstances when no adequate
remedy is available at law remains a central feature of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, the nation’s preeminent business
court.189
Indeed, while equity adjudication is a constitutive component of American corporate law as articulated in every state,190
Delaware is among the few states that have not moved toward a
consolidation of law and equity jurisdictions in the same
courts, but rather maintains a separate court of equity.191
Under this separation, the Chancery Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving equitable rights
(such as trusts and fiduciary duties)192 and equitable remedies
(such as injunctions and specific performance).193 The Chancery Court also has nonexclusive jurisdiction over suits involv188
The paradigmatic example was the English Chancellors’ grant of “common
injunctions” against the collection of judgments on sealed instruments issued by
law courts, at the time when these courts refused to recognize fraud as a defense
to an action on a sealed instrument. In fraud cases, the petitioner would thus ask
the Chancellor not to overturn or invalidate the law court’s judgment, but instead
to enjoin the judgment creditor from enforcing the judgment, because enforcement under the circumstances would be unfair. Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy
Truce Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8
DEL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005). Other paradigmatic cases of inadequacy of the common law to provide a remedy included, for example, the fact that a plaintiff was
unable to satisfy a technical element or evidentiary requirement for obtaining
relief at law, or that the common law lacked a writ for the harm the plaintiff had
suffered, or still that a common-law jury could be prejudiced against the plaintiff.
See David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J.
539, 555–58 (1986).
189
See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 819.
190
See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Corporate Natural Law: The Dominance of Justice
in a Codified World, 48 FLA. L. REV. 551, 552 (1996) (“[E]quitable principles rather
than statutes and other seemingly authoritative sources answer many of the most
substantial corporate law questions.”). For a thorough discussion of the use of
equitable remedies in current American law, see Samuel L. Bray, The System of
Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016).
191
See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 825–26 (explaining that Delaware’s decision to create it Chancery Court in 1792 contradicted the historical
trend of the time away from chancery courts). It is unclear whether policy or
pragmatic reasons motivated Delaware to move from a consolidated jurisdiction to
separated systems of law and equity. See id. at 826–31.
192
Trust and fiduciary duties have long been equity’s most important legal
doctrines, whose development dates back to the jurisdiction of the English Chancery Court. See id. at 821; Jacobs, supra note 188, at 5.
193
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341. Absent special statutory authorization, the
Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction “to determine any matter wherein sufficient
remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 342. These matters belong, instead,
to the Superior Court of Delaware, a court of law, which has “jurisdiction of all
causes of a civil nature, real, personal and mixed, at common law[,]” as well as
over criminal matters. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
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ing Delaware’s General Corporation Law and other business
entities, as well as business litigation involving charters, bylaws and merger agreements.194
The equity identity of the Chancery Court also means that
the court has no jury trials, only bench trials.195 All cases are
decided, and the underlying facts investigated, by the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor. As equity adjudicators, the chancellors
have wide latitude to craft remedies and mold earlier decisions
to fit particular fact patterns. Very much in the tradition of the
Chancery Court’s English ancestor,196 Delaware’s chancellors
are not bound by strict notions of precedent, but rather retain
broad discretion to do justice in individual cases based on
moral principles, standards of fairness, and flexible remedies.197 This trait of equity decision-making198 gives Delaware’s chancellors the ability to adapt the law to ever-changing
economic circumstances and legal relationships.
2. Equity’s Residual Indeterminacy
The Chancery Court’s flexibility does not come without
costs, though. Discretion to undercut the future applicability
194
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 111(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-111, 18-111.
Cases can be transferred between the Court of Chancery and the Superior Court
to ensure the appropriate court relief. See, e.g., Candlewood Timber Group, LLC
v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997–98 (Del. 2004) (transferring a case
from the Court of Chancery to the Superior Court upon concluding that the
plaintiffs’ request for specific performance would not adequately remedy the environmental damage that Pan American’s oil drilling allegedly caused to Candlewood’s property in Argentina).
195
See, e.g., Paron Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Crombie, No. 6380–VCP, 2012 WL
214777, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting that “there are no jury trials in
Chancery”); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027–VCL, 2010 WL
5550677, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (stating a trial by jury is “not available in
this Court”). However, a little-used provision exists that authorizes the Court of
Chancery to refer matters of fact in dispute to Superior Court for trial. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 369; see also Norm Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc. v. Dayon, No.
11733, 1992 WL 368587, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1992) (“I furthermore have the
discretion to grant a jury trial on the liquated damages claim should I determine
that it is warranted.”).
196
John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the History of
American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1998). It is worth noting, however, that the English system of equity was eventually assimilated to the common
law system, through the use of binding precedents and more rigid court practices.
Morley, supra note 187, at 229–30. Delaware, in contrast, has carefully avoided
to turn equity adjudication into a fixed system, bound by precedents and rigid
principles, and instead preserved the original equity focus on specific holdings
and ad hoc remedies. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 821.
197
William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to the Delaware Court of Chancery
1792–1992, 48 BUS. LAW. 363, 365 (1992).
198
Id. (describing equity as “the dynamic, creative component of the judicial
system”).
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of precedents also makes the law less predictable, leading to a
tension between flexibility and predictability. The criticism
that equity decisions may vary with the length of the Chancellor’s foot has long been out there.199 More recent versions of
this criticism suggest that Delaware purposefully maintains an
excessive level of indeterminacy in its corporate law, whether to
benefit the Delaware bar (as indeterminacy promotes litigation)200 or to maintain Delaware’s primacy in interstate competition (as indeterminacy makes the Delaware’s model more
difficult to mimic).201
We reject this criticism, making a two-part defence of Delaware’s equitable adjudication. First, the indeterminacy arising
from Delaware’s equity decision-making is not as severe as
portrayed by some commentators. Second, and most important for the purpose of this Article, Delaware’s approach is
economically rational.
(a) The matter of degree. Academic discussions around the
tension between flexibility and predictability in equity decisions echo the wider corporate law debate on the merits of rules
and standards as regulatory techniques.202 Rules favor predictability over flexibility, prescribing behavior ex ante and being typical of the “law model” of jurisprudence,203 under which
what matters is the certainty of the system, even when it may
occasionally produce “harsh result in individual cases.”204 By
contrast, standards privilege flexibility, “leav[ing] discretion for
adjudicators to determine ex post whether violations have occurred,”205 thereby escaping the rigidity of bright-line rules.
Commentators who criticize Delaware’s equity system for inde199

JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 49 (BOOKS FOR LIBRARIES PRESS 1972) (1855).
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 491–98 (1987).
201
See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998).
202
Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (Oct. 22,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/
workshop/leo/document/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RV9U-SDNA]. For the canonical view on the rules vs. standards debate, see Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557,
568–96 (1992).
203
See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4 (contrasting the “law model” of corporate
law with the “equity model”). More particularly, in corporate law, rules are usually employed in matters that affect a corporation’s relationship with its creditors
and investors, such as dividend restrictions, minimum capital requirements,
tender offers, and proxy voting. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 24 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 1st ed. 2004).
204
See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4.
205
See Kraakman & Hansmann, supra note 203, at 24.
200

R
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terminacy thus tend to describe it as centered around the “ample use of vague standards.”206
This characterization of the Delaware’s equity model, however, is misleading. The Delaware judiciary works vigorously to
minimize the uncertainty stemming from its decisions. As put
by former Justice (and Vice-Chancellor) Jacobs, Delaware
judges, both on the Chancery and Supreme Courts, have exerted a common effort “to create a ‘bright line’ around equity to
enable practitioners and their clients to predict when otherwise
legally valid corporate acts would become subject to equitable
nullification.”207 They have done so through the progressive
refinement of equitable doctrines, as articulated in both their
reasoned opinions and in the course of their extra-judicial activities, which include frequent speeches and articles and participation as policy makers in professional organizations.208
The appearance and evolution of the so-called heightened,
or “intermediate,” scrutiny of a board’s actions offers a prime
example of the effort made by the Delaware judiciary to make
equity more predictable. At first, Delaware only had two standards of review: the business judgement rule209 and the entire
fairness test.210 Then the Delaware courts began to add content to (and guidance in the application of) the two stan-

206

Kamar, supra note 201, at 1909.
See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 15. Jacobs also reports the view of other
commentators who suggest that, in brief, the bright line around equity mandates
that “acts that comply with the corporate statute are subject to invalidation on
equitable grounds, but equitable principles may not be used to salvage a corporate act that violates the corporate statute.” Id. (quoting Kurt M. Heyman &
Christal Lint, Recent Developments in Corporate Law: Recent Supreme Court Reversals and the Role of Equity in Corporate Jurisprudence, 6 DEL. L. REV. 451, 487
(2003)).
208
See Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verrett, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity
for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 192 (2007).
209
The business judgment rule (BJR) presumption that the directors acted on
an informed basis, in good faith, and in the interest of the company can only be
rebutted if the board’s decision is irrational or the plaintiff can show a breach of
the duty of care or loyalty, in which case the burden shifts to the directors to
demonstrate that their action was fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
210
The entire fairness test is the most onerous standard of review of directorial
conduct (i.e., standing at the opposite end of the spectrum of the BJR). It applies
whenever the directors propose or effect a transaction where they have a selfinterest which conflicts with that of the shareholders. The paradigmatic case is
an “interested” cash-out merger between a parent corporation and its subsidiary.
See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware’s Judge
Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 155 (2015).
207
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dards.211 Next, in response to the new realities and issues of
the takeover era, came the creation of an entirely new, “intermediate” set of principles in landmark cases such as Unocal212
(and its further elaboration in Unitrin213), Revlon214 (and its
further elaboration in Paramount v. QVC215), and Blasius,216
with each subsequent case offering a refinement of the new
heightened standards.217
Granted, these principles are not exact. But they are more
predictable than those recognized by the critics of Delaware
courts. They amount to a tertium genus between rules and
(vague) standards.218
(b) Economic rationality. Delaware’s tertium genus leaves a
residuum of indeterminacy in the adjudication of business litigation. But some level of indeterminacy should be welcomed as
beneficial, in light of the indeterminate results yielded by economic theory. Recall that GE fails to tell us how to work
211
For example, the entire fairness standard, which had been there since the
inception of Delaware’s equity adjudication, lacked specific content that facilitated predicting the outcome of litigation until the decision in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., when the Delaware Supreme Court specified that the inquiry into fairness
would consider both the decision-making process and the transaction price.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). For the subsequent
evolution of the entire fairness standard, see Jacobs, supra note 210, at 155–60.
212
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). In
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court announced that the fiduciary propriety of a
target company’s board’s adoption of antitakeover defenses would turn upon
whether the board’s decision was a proportionate response to a reasonably perceived threat. See id.
213
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367–68 (Del. 1995). In
Unitrin, the Supreme Court refined the proportionality prong of Unocal to tilt the
balance in favor of respecting the judgment of the target board. See id.
214
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). In
Revlon, the Supreme Court refined the Unocal standard by announcing that
whether a target company board acted properly in committing the company to a
sale or change of control transaction would turn upon whether the board’s decision-making process, and its result, were reasonable. See id.
215
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del.
1994) (specifying the criteria for “the range of reasonableness” of directors’ actions
in Revlon-like situations).
216
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding that where a board’s antitakeover defense involves a purposeful interference with the exercise of the shareholders’ right to vote, that defense would be
invalid unless the board can show a compelling justification).
217
For an exhaustive treatment of the evolution of the heightened standards of
review in the Delaware jurisprudence, see Jacobs, supra note 210, at 160–68. See
also T. Richard Giovannelli, Revisiting Revlon: The Rumors of Its Demise Have
Been Greatly Exaggerated, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513 (1996).
218
Cf. SMITH, supra note 202, at 38 (arguing that “decision making that is a
hybrid between law and equity is likely to be superior to law or equity alone”). Our
view is that, overall, Delaware’s “predictable” equity is a hybrid between pure
equity and law.

R
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through the tradeoff between agency costs and market inefficiency implied by the new hybrid corporation. Our recommendation in favor of private contracting directly follows from this
systemic indeterminacy. But if the economic system is indeterminate, then the judicial system must also leave room for indeterminacy under the rubric of discretion in adjudication. With
the rise of the hybrid corporation, the range of possible outcomes, including openings for taking opportunistic advantage,
becomes wider than ever.219
As put by Henry Smith in his analysis of equity jurisdiction, opportunism is a “behavior that is undesirable but that
cannot be cost-effectively captured—defined, detected, and deterred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking.”220 This open-ended
definition of opportunism captures both the traditional risk of
moral hazard by managers and the new forms of self-interest
on the side of empowered shareholders (such as short-termist
behavior), as well as the risk of abuses of bargaining power by
either managers or shareholders. Indeed, we view managershareholder contracting as an outcome that is superior to the
unilateral shareholder imposition of business decisions. It is,
however, an outcome not immune from inefficient distortions
arising from abuse of bargaining power. Equitable adjudication is the instrument that allows the Delaware courts to expost define, detect, and deter these distortions.221
Viewed through this lens, the landmark decision in Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.222—which commentators regard
as the beginning of an era in which the equity model progressively came to dominate the law model in Delaware jurisprudence223—provides a paradigmatic example of the use of
equitable adjudication to prevent managerial opportunism. In
that decision, reversing the prior ruling of the Chancery
Court,224 the Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned the board’s
219
Viewing equity as appropriately undetermined has deep historical roots,
going back to the Aristotles’ Nicomachean Ethics. As explained in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle believed that “because the material
of human acts is indeterminate . . . the law[ ] must be indeterminate in the sense
that it is not absolutely rigid.” 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 466 (C.I. Litzinger trans., 1964).
220
Smith, supra note 202, at 9.
221
Likewise, the flexibility of equity adjudication is the means that allows
judges to detect and mitigate the externalities that manager-shareholder contracting may impose on third parties, but the discussion of this use of equity
exceeds the scope of this paper.
222
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
223
See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 6.
224
See id. at 7.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt

2020]

unknown

CORPORATE LAW

Seq: 61

3-AUG-20

14:14

735

unilateral, and opportunistic, amendment of the company’s bylaws to the detriment of the company’s shareholders by holding
that “inequitable action [by corporate fiduciaries] does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”225
Using the same lens, reconsider now the philosophy of the
Delaware courts in employing heightened standards of review
for evaluating the board’s adoption of defensive measures.
When, during the takeover era, Delaware first allowed boards of
directors to deploy the poison pill to impose on hostile tender
offerors the added time and expense of control transfer by
proxy contest,226 responses grounded in agency theory were
understandably condemnatory. Today, with the hybrid corporation in view and the benefit of hindsight, we can recharacterize the takeover era cases as a defensible grant to the board of
bargaining power against investors. However, as made evident
by the progressive refinement of the heightened standards of
review, the grant was never so absolute as to leave investors
defenseless. The equity tools employed in those evaluations,
embodied in open-ended concepts like “proportional” and “draconian,” reflect the insight that opportunistic abuses must be
dealt with equitably, on the specific facts of the case.227
Along similar lines, Delaware has also recently taken the
lead in limiting the assumption that collective action problems
make public shareholders incapable of self-protection and
uniquely susceptible to exploitation.228 Law that follows from
these assumptions is beginning to be revised as courts and
legislatures reappraise the shareholders’ ability to use their
governance levers. Stepping up to the plate of this revision
process, Delaware has limited the application of enhanced fiduciary scrutiny of mergers,229 streamlined the shareholder
225
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). In
Chris-Craft, the incumbent directors decided to amend the bylaws for the sole
purpose of setting the annual meeting date five weeks earlier than the original
date so as to materially disadvantage the dissidents and substantially perpetuate
their control over the corporation. Id.
226
See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355–57
(Del.1985) (finding that Director’s decision to implement a poison pill was protected by the business judgment rule).
227
Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4–5.
228
See Jacobs, supra note 210, at 171–72.
229
See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015)
(confirming that business judgment is the appropriate standard of review in postclosing damages suits involving a merger subject to Revlon scrutiny that has been
approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (confirming that
the business judgment standard of review applies to a parent-subsidiary merger
that cashes out minority shareholders where the merger has been conditioned

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt

736

unknown

Seq: 62

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-AUG-20

14:14

[Vol. 105:675

merger approval process,230 and refrained from imposing strict
scrutiny on actions that increase the level of difficulty for activist hedge funds.231
It would be wrong to read these cases as the rote response
of courts structurally unsympathetic to the prerogatives of
newly empowered shareholders. Rather, these decisions are
better viewed as directed against opportunistic exploitation of
new shareholder prerogatives. Cases on hedge fund activism
are especially telling. In Yucaipa America Alliance Fund II, L.P.
v. Riggio,232 for example, the Delaware Chancery Court refused
to apply the line of cases that prohibits management impairment of the shareholder franchise233 to invalidate a poison pill
with a 20 percent ownership threshold promulgated to frustrate a proxy contestant.234 The ruling channeled activist objections to management defensive tactics to the more
permissive Unocal standard of review,235 appropriately recalibrating the parties’ bargaining power. In Third Point LLC v.
Ruprecht,236 the Chancery Court went further still, rejecting a
Unocal claim brought by an activist proxy contestant against a
poison pill with an innovative 10 percent ownership threshold
on the grounds that the contestant had power to influence
results and had an unobstructed path to appeal to the wider
shareholder voting population. And in the most recent case, In

upon the approval of both an independent and adequately-empowered special
committee of directors and an uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the
minority stockholders). This is a significant cutback on the merger’s zone of
exposure to fiduciary scrutiny under the Revlon doctrine.
230
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2019) (introducing the medium form
merger, a new mode that relies on friendly tender offers and bypasses the shareholder vote where the acquirer does not hold a 90% stake of the target ex ante).
231
See, e.g., Yucaipa America Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 329
(Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (applying Unocal’s reasonable
standard to the Board’s decision to implement a poison pill defense against activist shareholders); Third Point, LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL
1922029, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (same).
232
1 A.3d at 310.
233
The line begins with Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659
(Del. Ch. 1988).
234
See Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 330–36 (finding that the “compelling justification”
standard, under Blasius Industries and its progeny, did not apply).
235
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985);
see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995) (“[A]
board must sustain its burden of demonstrating that, even under Unocal’s standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, its actions deserved the protection of the
traditional business judgment rule.”); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (same).
236
Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20–*21.
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re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation,237 the Delaware
Chancery Court went so far as to find conflicted misconduct by
the activist hedge fund, while remarking that “[a]ctivist hedge
funds . . . are impatient shareholders, who look for value and
want it realized in the near or intermediate term. They tell
managers how to realize the value and challenge publicly those
who resist the advice, using the proxy contest as a threat.”238
The court once again focused on the imbalance in the parties’
bargaining power, an imbalance created by hedge funds’ ability
to exploit the proxy contest to lower the manager’s disagreement point.239
Commenting on these developments, Justice Jacobs suggests that “we may witness . . . a replay of the 1980s, where the
[Delaware] courts were forced to fashion new principles to redefine the power of the board to oppose hostile takeover bids by
third-party bidders.”240 The significant difference is that, “[t]his
time . . . the ‘outsiders’ will literally be ‘insiders’”241—the corporation’s own shareholders, which have grown sufficiently empowered unilaterally to determine corporate outcomes even in
the context of off-market contracting rather than by using market levers. If, as we suggest, shareholder power is here to stay,
we expect the trend toward the reversal of prior shareholder
solicitude in Delaware decisions to continue, with equitable
adjudication providing the legal platform to support this trend.
We have a final remark. A generation ago, Ed Rock effectively defended the Delaware courts against charges of management capture by highlighting the moral aspect of their
decision-making.242 We add an additional characterization:
the Delaware courts have proven themselves to be economically astute. Their equitable, consequentialist approach displays a better grasp of the operative economics than that of the
law professoriate that derived a legal theory from J-M’s partial
equilibrium model.

237
In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880–VCL, 2018 WL 5018535
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018).
238
Id. at *41 (alteration in original) (quoting Bratton & Wachter, supra note
61, at 682).
239
See supra text accompanying note 186.
240
Jacobs, supra note 210, at 171.
241
Id.
242
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013–14 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
If one goes to Westlaw and searches the phrase “general
equilibrium theory” in the law review database, one learns that
markets can be presumed to work and that regulation for purposes other than wealth reallocation is justified only by an
affirmative showing of market failure. Even then, regulatory
intervention must be further tested for political failure under
public and social choice theory.243 This normative extension of
GE might have been justified around 1960, before contemporary law and economics even existed, but thereafter the extension had no theoretical support. Until recently, however, the
only harm was inaccuracy, while structural problem remained
only nascent. This has changed with the rise of empowered
shareholders. Now, market-based coordination of business
planning has become a fact of corporate life, making it no
longer possible to ignore the real lesson of GE. That lesson is
that the market cannot efficiently coordinate the economy, unless one is willing to rely on Herculean assumptions.
It follows that it is not safe to assume that the agency cost
reduction stemming from shareholder empowerment maximizes value. Instead, this Article has shown that, in the present context, economic theory poses a fundamental trade-off
between agency costs and market inefficiency. Under these
tradeoffs, no template for efficient corporate law reform currently exists. The question, then, is this: Where should the
theory of the firm go from here? We answer that a fresh start
will be needed. Even as agency theory’s moral hazard account
no longer suffices to describe the salient problems in corporate
governance, there can be no reversion to the earlier view of
corporations as hierarchies operating outside of markets, for
243
Robert D. Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947,
951–52 (1997); see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643, 1690 (1996) (“Adam Smith suggested, and general equilibrium theory
proved, that competition for wealth in markets allocates resources efficiently.”).
One also learns that general equilibrium theory upholds the shareholder value
maximization norm. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of
the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1164 (1990). Our search, conducted on
July 22, 2017, yielded 122 articles. In the overwhelming majority, GE is cited, in
passing, in connection with a reference to neoclassical economic theory or within
a book title. Only four articles (one of which was co-written by one of us) highlighted the difficulties discussed herein. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M.
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 109–17
(2016); Huang, supra note 64, at 491; Lee, supra note 64, at 120; Alejandro Nadal,
Coasean Fictions: Law and Economics Revisited, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 569,
588–89 (2007).
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market forces now direct business decisions at the highest
level.
An attempt to provide a new operational model of the firm
goes beyond the scope of this Article—that formidable job will
most likely require a whole literature rather than a single intervention. We can, however, go back to basics and suggest which
bodies of economic theory can assist the enterprise. Our last
prediction is that the future lies with the economics of mechanism design, which can assist in answering several questions
about the efficient structuring of the corporate bargaining process. These questions include issues of optimal board decision-making, shareholder biases, conditions that may trigger
such biases, as well as questions on how to internalize externalities that incomplete markets cannot internalize and how to
provide managerial incentives that are compatible with not
only the shareholder interest but also the interest of society as
a whole.
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